Allegedly imminent threats to Canadian sovereignty and security are often overblown in the national news media. Despite consistent messaging from Global Affairs Canada that our country’s “Arctic sovereignty is longstanding and well established”1 and that our regional boundary disputes are well-managed and do not pose any security threats, Canadians are inundated with myths about our Arctic sovereignty being much more precarious than it is. This reinforces a deep-seated – and ill-founded – sense of insecurity about our Arctic sovereignty.
Canada’s sovereignty is rooted in its people. The North is a homeland which Indigenous peoples have inhabited since time immemorial. Through government-to-government relations rooted in mutual respect, recognition of Indigenous and treaty rights, and shared responsibilities articulated in land claims and other relationships, Indigenous peoples partner with the Canadian state in the exercise of sovereignty.
In its conventional definition, sovereignty is the internationally recognized right to control activities within a particular jurisdiction. In Canada’s case, no rival international actor suggests that it has a better claim to ownership of the lands or waters of the Yukon, NWT, and Nunavut. The Government of Canada has long maintained the legal position that our historic internal waters in our part of the Arctic, often referred to as the Northwest Passage, are subject to Canada’s full sovereignty. While the United States has a different legal stance on the status of the waters of Northwest Passage, it is important to understand that it is not suggesting that it or any other actor has a stronger sovereignty claim than Canada. No one is claiming rival ownership. Instead, the United States government asserts the right for ships and aircraft to transit through Canada’s Arctic waters and the narrow air corridor above them without asking our permission. Canada insists that this right to transit passage does not exist without other actors first securing our permission – which we have the right to refuse if we decide that this activity in our historic internal waters would be against our interests.2
Canada's 2024 Defence Policy Update, Our North, Strong and Free, warns that “Canada's Northwest Passage and the broader Arctic region are already more accessible, and competitors are not waiting to take advantage—seeking access, transportation routes, natural resources, critical minerals, and energy sources through more frequent and regular presence and activity.”3 Does this heightened maritime activity in Canada’s Arctic waters include foreign navies? Which pernicious actors are “exploring Arctic waters and the sea floor, probing our infrastructure and collecting intelligence”? Are these primarily military challenges, or illegal activities that should be countered and prosecuted using law enforcement and diplomatic tools?
Growing international interest in Arctic waters more broadly raises the possibility of non-Arctic states and other actors challenging Canada’s well-established legal position on the status of its Arctic waters. If a hostile foreign government’s warships passed into Canadian waters without our consent, this would certainly constitute a defence and security threat. There is no indication that such incursions are likely to occur in the Canadian Arctic in the near future, however, because there is no plausible scenario in which this would benefit any actor more than it would cost them.
Nevertheless, today’s world is more uncertain and geopolitics more contested than anytime since the end of the Cold War. Since February 2022, strategic rivalry between Russia and the Western democracies, including Canada, has had a negative “spillover” effect on circumpolar cooperation. Nevertheless, there is still little likelihood of armed conflict breaking out between Russia and Canada over Arctic resources, boundary disputes, or regional governance issues. Although Russia has brutally violated the sovereignty of Ukraine in its war against that country, this aggression in Europe does not make Russia more likely to mount a similar attack on Canada or any other Arctic state. It is important to remember that all of the seven like-minded Arctic states are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is the most powerful military alliance that the world has ever seen. For Russia to attack Canada with military force would invoke article 5 of NATO and would immediately trigger a world war. No one desires that outcome, including Russia.
The People’s Republic of China has also emerged as a global competitor – what the United States often refers to as a “pacing threat.” Canadians have been shocked by China’s arbitrary detentions of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor from December 2018 to September 2021, revelations of Beijing’s alleged attempts to interfere in the 2019 and 2021 Canadian federal elections, and China’s violations of human rights at home and internationally. Nonetheless, the Government of Canada has determined that it remains in its interests to work with China on global issues such as climate change mitigation, trade, and global public health. China is also an important market for Canadian commodity and agri-food exports, and its growing consumer market offers further opportunities for Canadian businesses. In a Northern Canadian context, analysts continue to analyze China’s potential desire to undermine Arctic state sovereignty to secure Arctic resources, shipping routes, and influence in regional governance. While media commentary often casually links China’s growing interest in the Circumpolar North with defence and hard security threats, there is no indication that China should be viewed as a direct military competitor in the Canadian Arctic at present or that it is seeking to challenge Canada’s sovereignty in the region in any direct way.4
Canada exercises its sovereignty through alliances. Working with key partners like the United States and NATO to defend Canada and North America is an expression of Canada’s sovereignty, because it is our right as a sovereign state to enter such alliances. Working with partners and allies is a source of strength, not a sign of weakness. Accordingly, it is important to avoid narratives – even well-intentioned ones seeking to drum up support for Canadian investments – that suggest our sovereignty is questionable if Canada chooses to defend itself by burden sharing with others. We must be careful not to downplay the strength of our alliances, and the benefits that these bring, when building the case for investments in Canadian sovereignty and security.
Security is different than sovereignty. In practical terms, national security relates to “any action or event that could materially impact the health, safety, security, or economic well-being of Canadians, or the effective functioning of Canada’s governments.”5 It is about Canadians being safe, and feeling safe, from threats. While traditional approaches to security focused on military aspects, the Copenhagen School identified the distinctive character and dynamics of security in five sectors: military, political, economic, environmental, and societal.6 Adopting this framework prevents analysts from associating all “security” issues with military security and assuming that DND/CAF are responsible for all things security in Canada.
Drawing distinctions between sovereignty and security can help to highlight substantive connects between particular projects and specific DND/CAF funding envelopes. Although the Defence Team itself often seems to conflate ideas of sovereignty, the preservation of territorial integrity, defence against foreign threats across the security spectrum, and domain awareness (with the April 2024 defence policy update a case in point), the territorial governments may find this problematic when it comes to discerning practical ways to align Northerners’ priorities with those of DND/CAF and other specific members of the Defence Team. By focusing on defence and national security in a deliberate and narrower sense, the territorial governments may avoid having its overtures to the Minister of National Defence simply passed along the to more general Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF) table coordinated federally by Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Development Canada (CIRNAC).
Precision in language that speaks directly to the mandates of individual federal departments and agencies might help to facilitate a breakthrough in securing detailed information, support, or partnerships for priority projects.
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Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He was Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories from 2014-2020 and was reappointed to this position from 2022-2025. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Brian Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University and the Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience, School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Indigenous-state relations. Whitney has (co-) written or (co-) edited more than sixty books and more than one hundred academic articles and chapters.
1 - CIRNAC, “Arctic and Northern Policy Framework International chapter” (2019), https://rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1562867415721/1562867459588.
2 - For background, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Suzanne Lalonde, and Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Canada and the Maritime Arctic: Boundaries, Shelves, and Waters (Peterborough: North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network , 2020), https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/CanadaMaritimeArctic-PWL-SL-ERD-2020.pdf.
3 - DND, Our North, Strong and Free.
4 - P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse and Ryan Dean, “Why China is Not a Peer Competitor in the Arctic,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 5/5 (2022): 80-97; Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse, Chinese Narratives and Influence in the Circumpolar Arctic: Greenland to the Russian Border (report to the Department of National Defence, submitted February 2023); and Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, “China’s Arctic Gambit? Contemplating Possible Strategies,” NAADSN Policy Brief, April 2020, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20-apr-23-China-Arctic-Gambit-RD-PWL.pdf.
5 - Fasken, “National Security Law,” https://www.fasken.com/en/knowledge/doing-business-canada/2021/10/23-national-security-law.
6 - Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997).