Commentary

In early June, Prime Minister Carney met with the nation’s Premiers and discussed “needed investments in dual-use infrastructure in Northern and Arctic communities that will address Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and security goals, meet local community needs, advance national energy independence, and unlock the North’s economic potential.”¹  

The idea of dual-use infrastructure in Canada’s Arctic and North is clearly top of mind for many decision makers, and following this trend, the Arctic Security Working Group (ASWG) met in Whitehorse on the 28th and 29th of May to discuss this topic. ASWG is co-chaired by the Commander Joint Task Force North (JTFN) and a rotation of the three territorial governments. The purpose of ASWG is to “enhance the safety and security of Canada’s North through information-sharing and cooperation among federal and territorial government department and agencies,” as well as facilitating planning with other partners such as Indigenous governments, academia, and the private sector.²  

Dual-use infrastructure was discussed extensively over the course of the two days, with some central themes emerging. First, there is a need to better define what constitutes dual-use infrastructure. Second, dual-use infrastructure should be used to achieve both national security and community resilience in the North and Arctic. Third, dual-use infrastructure can be cost-effective and scalable if it upgrades and retrofits existing infrastructure. From these three themes, one can extract three interrelated questions that can help to demystify the concept of dual-use infrastructure in Canada’s North and Arctic: What is dual-use infrastructure? What purpose does dual-use infrastructure serve? Why is dual-use infrastructure important?

What is dual-use infrastructure?

To date, Canada has not created a strict definition of "dual-use infrastructure," or an objective list of criteria to evaluate a project. Some may allude to the idea that dual-use infrastructure is infrastructure used for military activities on the weekdays and civilian activities on the weekends. Take for instance the Mary Lake Cadet Barracks outside Whitehorse, where in 2014 I stayed overnight for my grade 8 band camp and in 2021 was used to house Canadian Armed Forces members during their response to the Southern Lakes flooding. The gulf between these types of use underscores the need for actors in the Arctic security landscape to demystify and deromanticize the notion of dual-use infrastructure in the North.

Dual-use infrastructure should be thought of as conventional infrastructure that benefits everyday civilian and commercial needs while also contributing to strategic military considerations.³ Examples include upgraded all season roads, highways, bridges, airports, and aerodromes; energy transmission lines with increased redundancies; and more connected broadband and telecommunication networks; among other things.⁴

Of course, these are all examples of infrastructure that civilian Northerners would greatly benefit from. These are also examples of infrastructure that are essential for a sustainable military presence in the North that can be integrated into a nationwide Arctic security and defence strategy.³ Dual-use infrastructure should not only be thought of as a physical building used by both military and civilians, rather, it should be thought of as the everyday infrastructure Northerners rely on that can simultaneously contribute to effective military operations.

What purpose does dual-use infrastructure serve?

Another area that requires demystification is the purpose of dual-use infrastructure. Media coverage surrounding Canada’s Arctic sovereignty has been increasingly studied, with many researchers concluding that the media’s reactions to Arctic security are oftentimes “alarmist”⁵ and exposing Canadians to “myths about our Arctic sovereignty being much more precarious than it is.”⁶ In that sense, it is important to clarify the role that an increased military presence and dual-use infrastructure in the North would play.  

The vast majority of Arctic security scholars agree that despite rising geopolitical tensions around the world, the risk of an armed conflict in the Arctic is low. As a result, military investments in the North and Arctic are not so much intended for power projection as they are for increased domain awareness.³ The investments into the dual-use infrastructure described above should not be interpreted as the Canadian military gearing up for an impending armed conflict in the North and Arctic. Instead, investments in dual-use infrastructure should be viewed as a means to enhance the military’s ability to monitor the land, maritime, air and space, and cyber domains; engage in search-and-rescue operations; and respond to natural or human-made disasters (like the 2021 Southern Lakes flooding or the 2023 evacuation of Yellowknife due to wildfires).⁷  

While the above examples should be the primary purpose of dual-use infrastructure in the North, in the unlikely event of a major global conflagration in the Arctic or an unexpected event like the 2023 Yukon balloon incident, dual-use infrastructure will also be helpful to better coordinate and execute Canadian or allied military operations in the North.

Why is dual-use infrastructure important?

There is a general consensus that the well-being of Northern communities and Indigenous people is a fundamental prerequisite for Canada’s Arctic security.⁸ So while dual-use infrastructure contributes to strategic military objectives, it can also improve communication and accessibility in Northern communities and Indigenous communities. In turn, this can help alleviate pressures on “soft infrastructure” such as health care, housing, education, emergency services, and employment.  

For instance, improved telecommunications infrastructure and highways can facilitate the expansion of telehealth and enable greater integration of health and education service delivery between communities. Improved highways and airports can lower the cost of transportation, which can lower the cost of materials, construction, labour, and eventually, the cost of housing. Upgrading and building the infrastructure itself can create more employment opportunities while improved communication and accessibility can enable commuting or remote-work opportunities.⁹ Simply put, dual-use infrastructure not only helps military operations but can contribute to the well-being of Northern and Indigenous communities, ultimately strengthening Canada’s overall Arctic security.  

With the Government of Canada and other NATO allies recently announcing their commitment to spending 5% of GDP on national defence by 2035, including 1.5% of GDP (around $45 billion) on “defence and security-related...infrastructure and resilience,”¹⁰ there is certainly a massive opportunity to leverage dual-use infrastructure as a means of simultaneously advancing national security, improving the everyday lives of Northerners, and bolstering Canada’s overall Arctic security.  

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Zach Zimmermann is a Coordinator with the Canadian Institute for Arctic Security, a Research Fellow with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAASDN), and a Master's student doing research on military security in the High North. Born in Inuvik, NWT and raised in Whitehorse, Yukon, Zach is passionate about protecting his home, uplifting Northern youth voices, and eventually becoming an expert in Arctic Security.

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1 - Prime Minister of Canada. “First Ministers' statement on building a strong Canadian economy and advancing major projects.” Prime Minister of Canada / Premier ministre du Canada, 2 June 2025, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/06/02/first-ministers-statement-building-strong-canadian-economy-and-advancing-major-projects.  Accessed 13 June 2025.

2 - Department of National Defence. “Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces 2021-22 Departmental Results Report.” 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/departmental-results-report/2021-22-index.html.  

3 - Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Katharina Koch. “NORTHERN AND ARCTIC SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR A NORTHERN CORRIDOR.” The School of Public Policy Publications, vol. 14, no. 20, 2021, https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/EN_FR_NC25_Arctic-Security_Lackenbauer-Koch.pdf.

4 - Yukon Arctic Security Advisory Council. “Report of the Yukon Arctic Security Advisory Council.” Yukon Government, November 2024, https://yukon.ca/sites/default/files/eco/eco-arctic-security-advisory-council-report_0.pdf.

5 - Gayan, Praneel K. “Arctic Security and Sovereignty through a Media Lens: A Study by Mathieu Landriault.” NAASDN, 16 March 2021, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Gayan-policy-brief_Breaking-Through_Landriault-chapter.pdf  

6 - Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Situating the Yukon in Canadian Arctic Defence and Security.” NAASDN, April 2024, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2024apr-Lackenbauer-Yukon-defence-security.pdf.  

7 - Østhagen, Andreas. 2018. “Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic.” The Routledge Handbook of Polar Regions, M. Nuttall, T. R. Christensen, and M. J. Siegert, eds. Oxon and New York: Routledge p.348

8 - Carleton University. “Securing Canada's Arctic: A Strategic Imperative for Multi-Use, Multi-User Infrastructure.” Carleton University, 5 March 2025, https://carleton.ca/cipser/2025/securing-canadas-arctic/. Accessed 13 June 2025.  

9 - Christensen, Julia. “IMPLICATIONS OF A NORTHERN CORRIDOR ON SOFT INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE NORTH AND NEAR NORTH.” The School of Public Policy Publications, vol. 16, no. 25, 2023, https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/NC38-ImplicNC-on-Soft-InfrastructureNorth.Christensen-1.pdf.  

10 - NATO. “NATO Defence Ministers agree new capability targets to strengthen the Alliance.” NATO, 5 June 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_235900.htm.  

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The Arctic is no longer on the periphery of global affairs. Climate change evokes images of a resource-rich region increasingly accessible to outside actors. Technological advancement is providing competitors and adversaries with new strategic delivery systems which mean that North America is “no longer a sanctuary.” Time and space, including ballistic trajectories, make the Arctic a likely thoroughfare for a kinetic attack on the United States or Canada. In an era of renewed strategic competition, the risk of unintended escalation or the spillover of global conflict into the region cannot be dismissed.

Emerging thought leaders can study the Arctic and North in the abstract in distant classrooms, but our experiences in the region convince us that nothing can replace being there. While we often equate northern challenges with extreme cold weather, the practical realities associated with remoteness, sparse infrastructure, and vast distances are best understood by seeing it with one’s own eyes and learning from the people who live and operate in the region.  

In November 2024, we organized an Alaska/Yukon Field School on Strengthening Canada-US Arctic Defence and Security Cooperation and Policy, bringing twelve cadets from the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) together with nine students from universities across Canada on an 1100-km trip from Anchorage to Whitehorse.¹ Along the way, we visited the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF), received a commander’s brief at Eielson Air Force Base, and interacted with Canadian Rangers in Whitehorse, before holding culminating activities at Yukon University. Students engaged with a diverse array of northern researchers and practitioners with whom they learned about the multifaceted nature of Arctic security, various forms of expertise that contribute to the national defence and security enterprise, and the importance of Whole of Society approaches guided by the spirit of “nothing about us, without us” – assuring that Northern citizens are continuously engaged in planning, preparedness, and decision making.  

Students came to the activity aware that the Arctic has long been a conduit through which Russian strategic weapons could pass on their way to southern Canada and the lower forty-eight states. They also were aware that the threat of kinetic attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasing, and that both countries were fielding or testing advanced weapon systems which Canada and the United States cannot defeat with existing systems. They learned that the threat to the American Arctic had aspects that are distinct from the Canadian threat environment. The implications of these differences are often overlooked or downplayed by security commentators.

Students noted the significant military presence in Alaska compared to the Yukon. Elmendorf and Eielson Air Force Bases are huge, populated by fleets of advanced aircraft and supported by extensive critical military infrastructure. The commander’s brief unpacked for field school participants that this significant air power has two major roles. The first is to deter Russia and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and defend Alaska, if necessary, from a kinetic attack. The second role is to project force into the Pacific region in the event of war given the curvature of the earth and Alaska’s situatedness in the North Pacific - which explains recent suggestions that the Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) wants to reopen a base at Adak on the Aleutian Islands chain.²

At Eielson participants realized that Alaska is in the crosshairs of both the PRC and Russia in a way that Northern Canada is not. Alaska is the western flank of USNORTHCOM, charged primarily with defending the US homeland from attack. In the event of war with either Russia, the PRC, or both, USNORTHCOM can use Alaskan military power to intercept attacking bombers and missiles passing through its aerospace on their way deep into Canada and the US. Northern Canada shares this threat, and Canadian or NORAD military infrastructure like the North Warning System (NWS) is geared towards detecting and tracking threats passing through the Canadian Arctic destined for targets in the south. Geographical distinctions matter. Because Alaska also represents the northern flank of INDOPACOM, in the event of a conflict with the PRC, the US will project power from Alaska into the Pacific theatre. This creates an extremely strong incentive for the PRC to try and check that power projection capability. Technological advancement and increasing PRC military spending is giving it a greater range and depth of options to shoot the proverbial archer in Alaska before it can fire its arrows into the Pacific, as well as to thwart resupply of forward-deployed US forces in the state. This means Alaska must defend against these threats to it.

The Canadian Arctic has no power projection capabilities permanently stationed in it. Accordingly, in the event of war in the Pacific, there is much less incentive for the PRC to launch attacks directly against Canada’s northern territories. What are the implications for Canada’s defence posture?

The kinetic threat that the PRC poses to the Western North American Arctic is different for the US than for Canada. Alaska is a strategic hinge of USNORTHCOM and INDOPACOM, thus making it a geography in which the PRC would seek to disrupt US power projection capabilities into the Indo-Pacific region (the PRC’s own centre of gravity). This places distinct demands on Canada in terms of its contributions to NORAD modernization and how possible future cooperation on a “Golden Dome” missile defence system could work to detect, deter, and defend against threats through and to the North American Arctic. While the US must address probable PRC threats to and through its Western Arctic, Canada should focus on PRC threats through that subregion that would be intended to strike strategic targets further south in Canada or the continental United States.

While US strategic documents gesture towards these distinct dynamics, it was not until our group visited Alaska and spoke with practitioners that we gleaned this insight relative to Canada’s Western Arctic. Students left the Alaska/Yukon Field School with a new appreciation for how NATO’s “western flank” fits into continental and international defence.  

The participants in the field school developed a greater appreciation of how overall levels of development and infrastructure investment shape the Arctic experience for both civilian and military transportation. The vast breadth of Alaska and Canada’s northern territories, sparse populations, and infrastructure underinvestment places limits on transportation routing options. The Yukon Territory maintains approximately 4,800 kilometres of all-season highways that connect every local community, apart from the most northerly community, Old Crow, which is served exclusively by air. Participants learned how climate change will continue to have compounding effects on transportation systems and related infrastructure and exacerbate the need to address existing infrastructure deficiencies. For example, warming and thawing of ice-rich permafrost (which we learned about in a remarkable guided tour of the Permafrost Tunnel Research Facility near Fairbanks, operated by the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory as part of its mission for the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center) has led to ground settlement, slope instability, drainage issues, and road cracking.

The field school demonstrated the importance of providing experiential learning opportunities for emerging thought leaders to discern challenges and policy options in the shared Canada-US Arctic defence space. Having considered geography, cultures, and history in place, we hope that the participants will contemplate and strive to avoid past mistakes when the priorities of local populations and the particularities of place were overlooked or dismissed. Taken together, the opportunities, challenges, increased competition, and risks associated with a more accessible (and unpredictable) Arctic require a greater fidelity in anticipating and preparing to address different threats through, to, and in North American Arctic regions.

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Dr. Ryan Dean is a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN) at the Brian Mulroney Institute of Government at St. Francis Xavier University and a Network Coordinator with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) at Trent University.

Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He was Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories from 2014-2020 and was reappointed to this position from 2022-2025. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Brian Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University and the Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience, School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Indigenous-state relations. Whitney has (co-) written or (co-) edited more than sixty books and more than one hundred academic articles and chapters.

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1 - Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. Strengthening Canada-US Arctic Defence and Security Cooperation and Policy through Youth Experiential Learning. NAADSN, 9 June 2025, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/24nov-Lackenbauer-MINDS-TEG-Report-Alaska-Yukon-Field-School.pdf.

2 - Thompson, John. “U.S. Military Top Brass Look to Reopen Strategic Base on the Aleutians.” Alaska’s News Source, 11 Apr. 2025, https://www.alaskasnewssource.com/2025/04/11/us-military-top-brass-look-reopen-strategic-base-aleutians/.

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Security and safety threats in the Arctic originate within and have primary implications for the region. The pan-northern territorial leaders’ statement on climate change in Spring 2022 highlighted that increased funding for emergency management must be a key part of climate change response in the North.¹ Community first responders across the Canadian North often raise broader emergency-management and community-safety concerns, including the risks posed by fires, prolonged power outages, and other critical infrastructure failures. In particular, first responders flagged the broad spectrum of natural and human-made hazards created or exacerbated by climate change: forest fires; unpredictable ice conditions; permafrost thaw risks; severe weather events; erosion, water level and ice flow risks; flooding; and myriad issues raised by increased outside human activity, including environmental pollution and the prospect of a major marine disaster.² While DND/CAF and other federal departments have valuable (and sometimes essential) capabilities that can be brought to bear in response to non-military emergencies, it is important to acknowledge that they are often activated through a request for assistance (RFA) when a local or territorial government has primary responsibility for dealing with a particular threat.

The North is already warming at least twice as fast as the global rate, creating changes to the natural environment that affect the health and well-being of the territory’s residents and their traditional livelihoods, as well as infrastructure and the economy.³ Climate change is thus a threat multiplier across the North. The Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF) observes that “the qualities that make the Canadian Arctic and North such a special place, its size, climate, and small but vibrant and resilient populations, also pose unique security challenges, making it difficult to maintain situational awareness and respond to emergencies or military threats when and where they occur.” Climate change compounds these challenges, reshaping the regional environment and, in some contexts and seasons, facilitating greater access to an increasingly “broad range of actors and interests” (both Canadian and international) in the region. “The effects of climate change are perhaps most pronounced in the Arctic,” the Canadian Army’s modernizations strategy notes. "Rising activity levels in Canada's Arctic by state and commercial actors raise the potential for safety and security-related challenges," including "search and rescue operations, response to natural or man-made disasters, and response to actions by states with interests in the Arctic." The military is cast in a supporting role to other Canadian partners in a comprehensive Whole of Government approach, wherein the CAF assists other government departments and agencies in fulfilling their mandates within the safety and security domains.⁴

While most strategic analyses of the Arctic stress the role that climate and environmental change will play in “opening” the region to the broader world, this must be counterbalanced by considerations of the heightened constraints that changing and increasingly unpredictable environmental conditions will have on operations in the Canadian Arctic. “Geography and seasonal changes in climate will affect the degree of risk to the integrity of sparse Northern infrastructure such as roads, airfields, port facilities, communications networks, or power plants,” the 2013 Canadian Joint Operations Command Plan for the North noted. “The impacts of climate change are not only being observed from an economic vantage point, but the environmental impacts will put enormous strains on how the CAF conducts operations in the north and will require a change in how operations are planned and conducted.”⁵ For example, permafrost degradation not only inhibits mobility but also affects physical infrastructure, thus exacerbating sustainment problems (with a recent report predicting annual costs of permafrost damage to Yukon paved and gravel roads at between $73-85 million per year with adaptation measures).⁶ The North's road networks will continue to be affected by unusual and unpredictable seasonal temperatures and precipitation, resulting in shortened seasons or road closures.⁷ The increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather will affect operational activities, while changing sea ice conditions, ocean currents, and temperature complicate acoustic modelling and other operational and strategic planning factors.⁸ Consequently, the regional impacts of climate change over the short- to medium-term horizons are likely to exacerbate rather than alleviate operational challenges by increasing the level of uncertainty in the Canadian North.⁹

Provincial and territorial authorities are the first to respond when a major natural disaster occurs in Canada. If they become overwhelmed, they can ask the federal government for assistance. If the CAF is selected as the federal instrument to help, the response and ensuing efforts to stabilize a disaster situation falls within Operation LENTUS. There is an established plan of action to support communities in crisis that can be adapted to multiple situations, including forest fires, floods, ice storms, or hurricanes. The size of the CAF elements deployed is based on the scale of the disaster and the nature of the request for assistance from the territory, which the CAF uses to determine how many people and what kinds of assets to send.¹⁰

The high proportion of Indigenous people in the territories, coupled with Ottawa’s political focus on improving Indigenous-Crown relations and promoting reconciliation, lead most federal politicians to link Arctic security to Indigenous Peoples’ security. Studies and reports highlight longstanding inequalities in transportation, energy, communications, employment, community infrastructure, health services, and education that continue to disadvantage Northern Indigenous Peoples compared to other Canadians. Furthermore, poor socio-economic and health indicators affirm significant gaps between Northern Canadian jurisdictions and their southern counterparts, elucidating higher rates of human insecurity in the Canadian Arctic. While many of these issue areas fall outside of core national defence and national security mandates, they should be considered in light of broader nation-to-nation relationships and reconciliation agendas.

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Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer  is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He was Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories from 2014-2020 and was reappointed to this position from 2022-2025. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Brian Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University and the Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience, School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Indigenous-state relations. Whitney has (co-) written or (co-) edited more than sixty books and more than one hundred academic articles and chapters

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1 - NWT, Yukon, and Nunavut, Pan-Northern Territorial Leaders’ Statement on Climate Change (May 2022), https://yukon.ca/sites/yukon.ca/files/eco/eco-pan-northern-leaders-statement-climate-change-2022_0.pdf.

2 - See, for example, Peter Kikkert, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and Angulalik Pedersen, Kitikmeot Roundtable on Search and Rescue – Mass Rescue Table Top Exercise Report (2020), https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Kitikmeot-Roundtable-on-SAR-MRO-Tabletop-Exercise-Report-Feb-2020.pdf; Public Safety Canada, Canada’s National Adaptation Strategy: Building Resilient Communities and a Strong Economy (2023), https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2023/eccc/en4/En4-544-2023-eng.pdf; GNWT, Executive and Indigenous Affairs, “Pan-Northern Leaders’ Statement on Climate Change,” https://www.eia.gov.nt.ca/en/priorities/relations-federal-provincial-territorial-and-international-governments/pan-northern.

3 - YG, Science and Natural Resources, “Climate Change in the Yukon,” https://yukon.ca/en/climate-change-yukon.

4 - Canadian Army, Advancing with Purpose: The Canadian Army Modernization Strategy, 4th ed. (Ottawa: Canadian Army HQ, 2020), 7.

5 - Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) Plan for North, January 2014, file 3350-1 (J5), 11.

6 - Canadian Climate Institute (CCI), Due North: Facing the Costs of Climate Change for Northern Infrastructure (June 2022), 38, https://climateinstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Due-North.pdf.

7 - K. Pendakur, “Northern Territories,” in Climate Risks and Adaptation Practices for the Canadian Transportation Sector 2016, eds. K. Palko and D.S. Lemmen (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2017), 27-64.

8 - US Navy Chief of Naval Operations, The United States Navy Strategic Outlook for the Arctic (January 2019), 9.

9 - See, for example, Adam Lajeunesse and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, eds., Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Operations, 1945-2015: Historical and Contemporary Lessons Learned (Fredericton: Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society,2017); and P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, “An Important International Crossroads”: Implementing Canada’s Arctic Priorities in Strong, Secure, Engaged (Toronto: Centre for National Security Studies, Canadian Forces College, 2018), https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/CNSS/arctic-eng.pdf?cfc.

10 - DND, “Operation LENTUS,” https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-lentus.html.

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Despite a growing U.S. preoccupation with Chinese icebreakers or even submarines as real or potential capabilities designed to challenge Canada’s Arctic sovereignty or launch attacks against the Arctic states,¹ it is important to remember that China’s ability to project conventional military power into the Canadian Arctic remains minimal. It is likely to remain so, given the limited strategic gains that it would realize by doing so compared to commensurate energies dedicated to other parts of the world, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.²

Apart from the speculation that China’s naval expansion will support its ambition to become a “polar great power” (a concept that experts say is more nuanced that it might appear),³ Our North, Strong and Free describes various Chinese threats that are not primarily military: “dual-purpose research vessels and surveillance platforms collecting data about the Canadian North that is, by Chinese law, made available to China’s military”; and its “expanding … investments, infrastructure and industrial scientific influence throughout the Arctic region" (although this statement seems to overinflate the success of China's attempts to make these kinds of inroads in Arctic states other than Russia).⁴ Accordingly, domain awareness is essential to ensure that foreign actors are not engaged in illegal behaviour in the Canadian North, which requires a Whole-of-Society effort to identify suspicious activities and pass along relevant information to the appropriate people at the speed of relevance.

The CAF’s Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept, released in November 2023, provides a clear articulation of how adversaries are challenging Canada and its allies in the maritime, land, air, space, and cyber domains, as well in the information environment. While Canada’s military is “currently configured to counter overt military actions in the traditional domains of land, sea, and air by recognizable force elements of an adversary’s armed forces,” many of the hostile activities that threaten us today fall below the threshold of armed conflict. This requires a new approach to defence and security that more fully integrates various instruments of national power to uphold Canadian national interests in an era of ongoing competition, contestation, confrontation, and conflict. The language is worth repeating in detail:

The hostile intentions and actions of our adversaries show that they consider themselves to be at war with the West. We must accept this reality and respond accordingly. We must at all times be postured both to deter war and, in alignment with our partners in government, to compete below the threshold.

Second, our adversaries are challenging us in the cyber and space domains as well as in the land, maritime, and air domains. They use information to sow confusion, mask their intentions, oppose our actions, and gain advantage over us. We must meet these challenges across domains and in the information environment.

Third, military power alone is insufficient to deter and defeat the aggressive actions and behaviours of our adversaries. The military instrument must coordinate more closely with other instruments of national power. (Emphasis in original.)⁵

In Canada and North America more generally, adversaries seek to “threaten our governance, our national unity, and our critical infrastructure,” and may “attempt to impede our decision-making, cause inaction, or undermine our relations with allies.” The effects of climate change are “aggravating these challenges.”⁶ 

Thus, even if the conventional military threat environment in the territories is low, a holistic pan-domain approach must also acknowledge and address “actions not traditionally considered to be military in nature.” The Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept astutely notes that:

Sound policy providing for suitable authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities (ARAs) will be crucial to enabling such flexibility. In many cases the CAF will not have a lead role in the actions taken by the Government of Canada. In these cases, the CAF must be prepared to support the actions of other instruments of national power and draw from its broad experience base to advise on government responses to competition and conflict.

This logic should also apply to the territories, which can play a valuable role in informing assessments that deepen understandings of domestic trends and can help to convey “messages that are deliberate, coherent, and aligned with strategic objectives”⁷ across military, political, economic, environmental, and societal sectors of security.

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Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer  is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He was Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories from 2014-2020 and was reappointed to this position from 2022-2025. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Brian Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University and the Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience, School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Indigenous-state relations. Whitney has (co-) written or (co-) edited more than sixty books and more than one hundred academic articles and chapters.

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1 - Adam Lajeunesse, “China’s Mahanian Arctic Ambitions: Second Thoughts,” Canadian Naval Review 15/2 (2019): 17-22.

2 - Ryan Dean and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “China’s Arctic Gambit? Contemplating Possible Strategies,” NAADSN Strategic Perspectives, 23 April 2020, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20-apr-23-China-Arctic-Gambit-RD-PWL-1.pdf.

3 - See, for example, Marc Lanteigne, “Arctic Security in Our North Strong and Free: Canada Needs to Get China and Russia Right,” NAADSN Quick Impact (April 2024), https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/24apr10-Lanteigne-Quick-Impact-Arctic-Security-China-Russia.pdf.

4 - DND, Our North, Strong and Free, 4. See also Bryan Millard and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Trojan Dragons? Normalizing China’s Presence in the Arctic,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute Policy Paper (June 2021), https://www.cgai.ca/trojan_dragons_normalizing_chinas_presence_in_the_arctic; P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, and Ryan Dean, “Why China is Not a Peer Competitor in the Arctic,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 5, no. 5 (2022): 80-97; and Adam Lajeunesse and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Selling the ‘Near Arctic’ State: China’s Information and Influence Options in the Arctic (Wilson Center/NAADSN, forthcoming June 2024).

5 - DND, Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept (November 2023), 15.

6 - DND, Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept, 16, 13.

7 - DND, Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept, 18.

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Security threats to the Canadian Arctic emanate from outside the region but target or affect the region itself. Climate change is the primary existential threat to the Arctic – as NATO’s 2030 agenda suggests, it is “the defining interest of our time.”¹ While Northerners are adapting to the effects of climate change, the mitigation of climate change cannot be accomplished in the Arctic itself. It requires global action. While NATO has stated that it intends to be the leading international organization in understanding and adapting to the impacts of climate change on security, Canada and other countries will pursue most of the action on climate change mitigation through other multilateral channels. There is no desire or benefit to “securitizing” climate change as a threat to the territories by assigning DND/CAF or other security agencies the lead responsibility for addressing its root causes (at least beyond reducing military greenhouse gas emissions). Instead, Canada and its subnational partners will continue to pursue diplomatic action in international forums with much broader mandates than national defence.²

Within the defence and security realm, Arctic threat assessments should clearly explain at what part of North America or the Arctic these systems or capabilities are most likely to be directed. For example, geographic proximity means that immediate threats that Russia’s military buildup poses to the Norwegian Arctic do not necessarily threaten the Canadian Arctic.³ Accordingly, generalizing about threats to Canada posed by Russia’s “Arctic capabilities” (particularly land and naval forces) can be problematic, and might distort the appraisal of where and when Canada might be called upon to be a “provider” (rather than a “consumer”) of collective security.

While the regional and global threat environments have changed since Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, most threat assessments do not suggest that Russia is more likely to attack the Canadian North using kinetic military forces. Given that any Russian invasion of sovereign Canadian territory would constitute an act of war, and thus lead to the mobilization of our NATO allies (and the American nuclear deterrent), there is little to no likelihood that Russia would risk a general war with the West to try to acquire Canadian Arctic territory or resources. Geography and geostrategic considerations mean there is no simple analogy to what has transpired in Ukraine.⁴

Over the last two decades, Russia has devoted considerable resources to modernizing its fleet of nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines - despite the serious financial constraints that country faces. This spending affirms the priority that the Russian government places on this arm of its military, one which has a history of operating in the Arctic Ocean and perhaps even in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.⁵ In spite of these growing capabilities, the challenge lies in inferring Russian intent and deciding what gains Russia perceives that it could secure through military action in the region.

Does Russia pose a maritime threat to or in Canada’s Arctic waters? In a polemical March 2016 Wall Street Journal article, Scott Borgerson and Michael Byers suggested the threat of “naval vessels from Russia and other unfriendly nations passing through the Northwest Passage, or terrorists and smugglers seeking to enter North America from there…. The sea-ice is melting, foreign ships are coming, and there is little to stop an increasingly assertive Russia from sending a warship through.”⁶ This assertion misses the mark on several grounds. First, studies of northern shipping routes and sea-ice dynamics consistently suggest that Canada’s Arctic waters are not a safe or reliable sea route for transit shipping. They are less attractive than the Northern Sea Route (which runs north of Russia’s coastline) and even a possible transpolar route through the Central Arctic Ocean into the future. Russia is unlikely to risk damaging a billion-dollar warship to sail through Canada’s Arctic waters for unclear strategic objectives, and Moscow has no desire to demonstrate the feasibility of a Northwest Passage when it is competing to attract activity in its Northern Sea Route.

Furthermore, the scenario a Russian “freedom of navigation” voyage through the Northwest Passage overlooks how, for more nearly a century of straightforward self-interest, Russia has passively supported the idea that Canada enjoys control over a “sector” of the Arctic and/or that the Northwest Passage constitutes internal waters. Russia claims sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route, and to challenge Canadian sovereignty by treating the Northwest Passage as an international strait would undermine its own legal position in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation. Although transiting the Northwest Passage (by air or sea) in violation of Canada’s internal waters position might afford closer launch sites for ballistic or cruise missiles in a wartime scenario, in a peacetime context this would likely invite an American reciprocal “freedom of navigation” voyage through Arctic waters that Russia claims as internal (and the U.S. consider an international strait). Presumably this would offset any benefits that Russia might gain from challenging Canada’s legal position.⁷

Instead, Russian activities against the Canadian North are likely to take the form of “grey zone” or hybrid threats, below the threshold of armed conflict, which seek to disrupt systems, undermine democratic institutions, and sow or exacerbate divisions amongst Canadians.⁸ The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats defines these threats as:

Such actions are coordinated and synchronized and deliberately target democratic states’ and institutions’ vulnerabilities. Activities can take place, for example, in the political, economic, military, civil or information domains. They are conducted using a wide range of means and designed to remain below the threshold of detection and attribution.”⁹  

By combining conventional and unconventional means (such as disinformation and interference in political debates or elections, disrupting or attacking critical infrastructure, cyber operations, and asymmetric military means), hybrid actors use ambiguity and intermediaries (or proxy actors) to make it difficult to attribute responsibility and respond. As a recent report notes, “resilience and defence against hybrid threats in Canada require greater integration of military and non-military discussions on Arctic vulnerabilities to better understand how they interact and expose Canadians to harm caused by adversarial states that seek opportunities to advance their interests in the Arctic to Canada’s detriment.”¹⁰

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Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer  is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He was Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories from 2014-2020 and was reappointed to this position from 2022-2025. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Brian Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University and the Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience, School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Indigenous-state relations. Whitney has (co-) written or (co-)  edited more than sixty books and more than one hundred academic articles and chapters.

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1 - NATO factsheet, “NATO 2030” (June 2021), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/2106-factsheet-nato2030-en.pdf.

2 - P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “NATO, Climate Change, and Security,” NATO Resilience Working Group meeting, Warsaw, Poland, 10 June 2022. For a recent expression of concern about militarizing the climate crisis, see Daniela Philipson Garcia, Feminist Interventions: Resisting the Militarization of the Climate Crisis (We Do and the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, June 2023), https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/WEDO_CFFP_MilitarismClimateBrief_June2023.pdf.

3 - Andreas Østhagen, Gregory Levi Sharp, and Paal Sigurd Hilde, “At Opposite Poles: Canada’s and Norway’s Approaches to Security in the Arctic,” Polar Journal 8, no. 1 (2018): 163-181.

4 - On the continuing relevance of geography, see Ryan Dean and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Geostrategy and Canadian Defence: From CP Stacey to a Twenty-First Century Arctic Threat Assessment,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 20, no. 1 (2019): 34-96, https://jmss.org/article/download/69488/53633.

5 - Michel Byers, “Russian Maps Suggest Soviet Subs Cruised Canadian Arctic,” Globe and Mail, 6 December 2011.

6 - Scott Borgerson and Michael Byers, “The Arctic Front in the Battle to Contain Russia,” Wall Street Journal, 8 March 2016.

7 - On the similarities between Canadian and Russian positions on Arctic waters, see Aldo Chircop, Ivan Bunik, Moira McConnell and Kristoffer Svendsen, “Course Convergence? Comparative Perspectives on the Governance of Navigation and Shipping in Canadian and Russian Arctic Waters,” in Ocean Yearbook 28, ed. Aldo Chircop, Scott Coffen-Smout, and Moira McConnell (Brill, 2014): 291-327.

8 - See, for example, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Troy Bouffard, and Adam Lajeunesse, “Russia’s Information Operations: The Kremlin’s Competitive Narratives and Arctic Influence Objectives,” Journal of Peace and War Studies 4 (2022): 161-186, https://www.norwich.edu/pdfs/pawc/journal/PAWC_Journal_2022_P.%20Whitney%20Lackenbauer,%20Troy%20Bouffard,%20and%20Adam%20Lajeunesse.pdf.

9 - European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, “Hybrid threats as a concept,” https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats-as-a-phenomenon/.

10 - Gaelle Rivard Piché and Bradley Sylvestre, “Vulnerabilities and hybrid threats in the Canadian Arctic: Resilience as defence” (European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, May 2023), https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/20230529-Hybrid-CoE-Working-Paper-24-Canadian-Arctic-WEB.pdf.

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Threats that pass through the Arctic emanate from outside of Canada and pass through or over Canada’s North to strike targets outside of the region.

The North American homeland is no longer a “sanctuary” insulated from global threats. Because of the flight paths of strategic delivery systems that adversaries might launch at North American targets, this makes Canada’s Northern territories important to overall continental defence. For example, an advanced cruise missile with conventional warheads launched from Russia would likely pass over the Canadian Arctic before striking at a target in the northern continental United States. Sensor systems to detect the launch and track the missile might be based in the Arctic, but they are not primarily intended to defend Canada’s North. Nevertheless, investments in these systems can benefit the North – if we discern opportunities to leverage investments in dual-use infrastructure and sensor systems that secure “information dominance” for Canada and its allies, while simultaneously helping to address persistent communications and transportation gaps in the Arctic.

While physical geographical space remains constant, advanced technologies allow would-be adversaries to compress the time that it takes for offensive weapon systems to cross vast distances. “Russia has posed a nuclear threat to North America for over half a century, but has only recently developed and deployed capabilities to threaten the homeland below the nuclear threshold,” the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander told a US Senate committee in April 2019. “Russia continues to hone and flex its offensive cyber capabilities, and its new generation of advanced air- and sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly greater standoff ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing them to strike North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage.”¹

To address this threat, Minister of National Defence Anita Anand made a once-in-a-generation defence announcement on 20 June 2022, committing to a six-year, $4.9 billion plan to upgrade Canada’s continental defence systems, and $38.6 billion to modernize NORAD over the next two decades.² Situating the need for more robust defences to counter “new threats” from strategic competitors like Russia and China, Anand had assessed the previous month that “we do live in a world at the present time that appears to be growing darker.” She continued to explain that, “in this new world, Canada’s geographic position no longer provides the same protection that it once did. And in this new world, the security environment facing Canada is less secure, less predictable and more chaotic.”³  

The foundation of the plan is Canada’s ongoing commitment to NORAD – a binational command with the United States which Anand characterized as “our most important ally, our strongest partner, and our closest friend.” Building on the August 2021 joint announcement,⁴ the lion’s share of the promised investments will upgrade technology in support of the command’s roles. This is the first major modernization since the 1980s and the upgrading of the 1950s-era Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line to the current North Warning System (NWS). NORAD was founded in 1957 “against the backdrop of the Cold War and the threat of a Soviet-era air attack,” and Anand emphasized that it “has continually adapted and evolved in responses to new threats” that now included a “pressing need” to address hypersonic weapons, advanced cruise missiles, and other means wielded – or soon to be wielded – by strategic competitors who might wish to hold North America hostage. This required “turn[ing] another page and begin NORAD's next chapter.”

First, Canadians will be provided with four overlapping layers of situational awareness to detect threats passing through the Arctic on their way to Northern American cities in the south. Investments in a new Northern Approaches Surveillance System will contain three core elements:

1. An Arctic over-the-horizon (OTH) radar system to provide early warning and threat tracking across Canada, from the southern border with the United States to the Arctic Circle;
2. A Polar OTH radar system to provide an early warning function well past the Canadian Arctic Archipelago far out into the northern most approaches to North America, enabling monitoring of the entirety of the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone (CADIZ); and
3. A new system dubbed “Crossbow” which is a network of other sensors – and their supporting communications infrastructure – distributed across Northern Canada as another layer of detection.

The tremendous amount of data these new layers of awareness will generate will be ingested by new “technology-enabled decision-making” capabilities,⁵ the second major component of NORAD modernization. Technological innovation initiatives include constructing a new positioning, navigation, and timing capability to assist with air navigation in remote areas; and enhancing satellite communications across the Arctic. This is central to the CAF’s search and rescue and emergency responses, as well as its deterrence and defence missions.

General Eyre reinforces that a modernized NORAD will expand the strategic deterrence that our continental defence systems provide to Canadians. NORAD was originally built around providing early warning of an incoming Soviet nuclear attack, which would allow US strategic forces to respond in kind. This “deterrence by punishment” is about imposing the cost of nuclear annihilation on adversaries. Modern threats like hypersonic glide vehicles can threaten North America with conventional weapons below the nuclear threshold, however, thus calling into question the credibility of nuclear punishment. Eyre explains that developing the “ability to intercept” these threats will grant a “deterrence by denial” capability – to raise the costs of an adversary’s action for attacking. Ultimately, the integration of these two approaches to deterrence will yield a more comprehensive and more credible defence of Canada and of North America. As has been the case since the Cold War, the territories’ geographic position makes them an important element in this defence of Canada and continental defence system.

It is important to emphasize that these systems are designed to defend the continent as a whole, not just specific regions like the territories or individual pieces of critical infrastructure. As noted earlier, the great circle route over the pole makes the Arctic a likely conduit of attack on North America by foreign aerospace threats, rendering Canada vulnerable to rapid precision strikes or out-right nuclear destruction using those delivery systems to pass through or over the territories.⁶ The need for would-be adversaries to actually enter into the Canadian Arctic more generally to launch these weapons, however, is unclear. Furthermore, the sheer expanse of the Arctic Ocean, the vast size of the Canadian North, limited infrastructure, extreme climate, and challenging operating conditions all reduce the threats posed by foreign ground forces and maritime surface fleets.⁷ Nevertheless, the territories’ strategic location allows for advance detection of and responses to threats to North America as a whole.

The YG acknowledges that, “over the coming decades, the NORAD modernization programs have the opportunity to deliver considerable positive impact on Northern communities and build resiliency. However, while billions have been announced to support NORAD, much of that will not be spent in the North; the bulk of the spending is expected to go to southern firms for specialized equipment and services.” This is a sober assessment reflects subsequent explanations by the Government of Canada about what this “generational investment” will fund. At the same time, the Yukon also prioritizes “maximizing the legacy benefits of NORAD investments made in the territory” and emphasizes that, “as the modernization plan is assembled, Canada must look closely at the assets that can be left in communities for future use – not only infrastructure and equipment, but also experience, training and capacity-building.”⁸ The April 2024 defence policy update, and its particular emphasis on expanding the military’s “presence” in the Arctic and North (including through specific initiatives like Northern Operational Support Hubs) may open more “significant opportunities to establish multi-purpose infrastructure that serve the Canadian Armed Forces, other federal partners, territorial governments, Indigenous partners, and northern communities, wherever possible.”⁹

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Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer  is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He was Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories from 2014-2020 and was reappointed to this position from 2022-2025. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Brian Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University and the Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience, School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Indigenous-state relations. Whitney has (co-) written or (co-) edited more than sixty books and more than one hundred academic articles and chapters.

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1 - General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander, statement to Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing, 3 April 2019. For the latest US language, see General Glen D. VanHerck, statement to Senate Armed Services Committee, 23 March 2023, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/NNC_FY23%20Posture%20Statement%2023%20March%20SASC%20FINAL.pdf

2 - DND News Release, “Minister Anand announces continental defence modernization to protect Canadians,” 20 June 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/minister-anand-announces-continental-defence-modernization-to-protect-canadians.html; DND, “NORAD modernization project timelines,” last updated 24 March 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/allies-partners/norad/norad-modernization-project-timelines.html.

3 - Amanda Connolly “Canada’s defence minister says the world is ‘growing darker’ and ‘more chaotic’,” Global News, 10 May 2022, https://globalnews.ca/author/amanda-connolly/.

4 - DND, “Joint Statement on NORAD Modernization,” 14 August 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2021/08/joint-statement-on-norad-modernization.html.

5 - See Ryan Dean and Nancy Teeple, “Third Report: JADC2/JADO,” CDA Institute, 28 October 2020, https://cdainstitute.ca/norad-modernization-report-three-jadc2-jado/.

6 - See Kenneth Eyre, “Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North, 1947-87,” Arctic 40:4 (December 1987): 294-6.

7 - Canadian Forces Employment and Support Concept for the North (23 March 2011), 6-7. This confirms the observations in Eyre, “Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North,” 294.

8 - YG Submission to SSCNSDVA.

9 - DND, Our North, Strong and Free, 25.

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In the first decades after Confederation, the Dominion of Canada wrestled with the challenges of demonstrating sovereignty over the vast Canadian landmass. The first four provinces were small and, in 19th-century terms, densely settled. But in only thirteen years the nation expanded exponentially, making it difficult for a small government to assert control over the entire country.

We have forgotten how quickly Canada grew after 1867. It started small: Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec and Ontario, with neither of the last two including their present northern regions. The massive Hudson’s Bay Company territories in Rupert’s Land, representing over one-third of all Canadian lands, were added in 1870. British Columbia joined the following year. Prince Edward Island came on board in 1873, adding another province but not much land. The last major acquisition came in 1880, when Britain transferred to Canada its somewhat tenuous claims to the Arctic Islands. Confederation was completed in 1949, when the Dominion of Newfoundland, with a significant population and stable administration, joined Canada.

Between 1867 and 1880, the Dominion of Canada added a land mass vastly larger than Great Britain, more than a quarter of it north of the tree line. Much of it was sparsely populated, mostly by First Nations, Metis, and Inuit, with a small agricultural population on the prairies, some developed areas in southern and coastal British Columbia, and some fur trading posts scattered around the rest of what was now called Canada. With a population of only 3.6 million in 1870 and the British troops that had been stationed in the country on their way home, the nation had no plan - and no capacity - to assume responsibility for defending its sovereignty over any of this.

Then as now, Canada’s approach to protecting its jurisdiction depended on the rest of the world not having much interest in the area and on responding with a short-term intervention if Canadian sovereignty was threatened. The Americans paid little attention to Red River (Manitoba) and British Columbia, and chose not to pursue what jingoists amongst them described, Donald Trump-like, as their Manifest Destiny to control all of North America.

However, when in the spring of 1873, a handful of American traders highlighted the absence of Canadian authority by attacking First Nations people in what is now southern Alberta, the federal government responded by creating a paramilitary force, the North-West Mounted Police. The red-serged police quickly became iconic, representing the assertion of Canadian sovereignty in western and later in northern Canada. The NWMP played a vital role in maintaining Canadian control over the world-famous Klondike gold field in the 1890s, even though American miners vastly outnumbered Canadians there. Most of the provinces had their own police forces, but the prairie west and later the huge northland was overseen by the Mounted Police.

It was however in the Canadian Arctic that the NWMP led one of the most remarkable extensions of sovereignty in history. Starting in the years immediately after the Gold Rush, the police began to establish posts and carry out a series of lengthy patrols, asserting Canadian control over large territories that were barely outlined on the maps and that previously had no government presence.

Beginning in 1903 with a post on Herschel Island just off the north coast of Yukon, and ending with Bache Peninsula in 1926, halfway up the east coast of Ellesmere Island, the police established markers of sovereignty over the entire area of the inhabited Canadian Arctic, and in the case of Bache Peninsula, a part of it that was entirely uninhabited. Each one had a post office, significant because these were an internationally recognized assertion of sovereignty.

The purpose of these police operations was simple: to show the flag across the vast expanse of the Canadian Arctic and to demonstrate, in widely recognized ways, that Canada was in control of its territories. The scale of these operations was, by modern standards, ludicrously small. An online history of the Mounted Police says “by 1919 the entire Arctic was under Canadian jurisdiction containing 25 detachments and over 70 men.” Seventy men for the modern Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut--an area of about 3.8 million square kilometers!

Canada held to this approach until the 1940s, beginning to change only when the United States decided to build a highway to Alaska and construct an oil pipeline and refinery complex to support the defence of Northwest North America. Canada played a similar background role in the Cold War build up in the Arctic, supporting rather than leading the addition of new defensive systems in the Far North.

Between 1942 and 1947, a unit of the Canadian Military Reserves known as the Canadian Rangers, now numbering about 5,000 northern residents, was set up to demonstrate sovereignty by carrying out patrols and acting as guides and scouts in the region. They provided a limited military presence in the north, and were much cheaper to operate than regular troops would have been.

For generations, Canada did not have to do much to defend the North, because outside interest was minimal, threats close to non-existent, and internal pressure inconsequential. Free to do almost nothing, Canada opted to maintain the thinnest possible presence in the Arctic, reacting occasionally when presented with a temporary challenge to its sovereignty, such as the 1969 voyage of the SS Manhattan, an American oil tanker, the first commercial ship to venture the Northwest Passage. Canada voiced its claims of sovereignty over the passage, but the Americans disputed it then and now, and nothing came of the issue.

Now, however, it is clear that showing the flag is no longer enough. For generations, Canada has done northern defence and security on the cheap, counting on the lack of outside threats, the American military, and Arctic geography to protect us. That safe and secure world no longer exists, as has recently been demonstrated by Donald Trump’s bloviating fantasies about absorbing our country, by the possibility of Russian aggression, and by geopolitical uncertainty focused on China. Long gone are the days when a post consisting of two Mounted Police officers and some Inuit helpers, with a post office that received mail once a year, could assert Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

The contemporary Arctic requires a much more consequential and substantial Canadian military presence and, even more, a 21st-century defence strategy, co-developed with Indigenous organizations and territorial governments, that prepares Canada for a confusing and chaotic world. The appalling political events to the south of us have made it clear that we must at last take charge of and responsibility for the enormous and important area of our country that for so long and so shamefully we neglected.

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William R. Morrison is an Emeritus Professor of History at the University of Northern British Columbia.

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Allegedly imminent threats to Canadian sovereignty and security are often overblown in the national news media. Despite consistent messaging from Global Affairs Canada that our country’s “Arctic sovereignty is longstanding and well established”¹ and that our regional boundary disputes are well-managed and do not pose any security threats, Canadians are inundated with myths about our Arctic sovereignty being much more precarious than it is. This reinforces a deep-seated – and ill-founded – sense of insecurity about our Arctic sovereignty.

Canada’s sovereignty is rooted in its people. The North is a homeland which Indigenous peoples have inhabited since time immemorial. Through government-to-government relations rooted in mutual respect, recognition of Indigenous and treaty rights, and shared responsibilities articulated in land claims and other relationships, Indigenous peoples partner with the Canadian state in the exercise of sovereignty.

In its conventional definition, sovereignty is the internationally recognized right to control activities within a particular jurisdiction. In Canada’s case, no rival international actor suggests that it has a better claim to ownership of the lands or waters of the Yukon, NWT, and Nunavut. The Government of Canada has long maintained the legal position that our historic internal waters in our part of the Arctic, often referred to as the Northwest Passage, are subject to Canada’s full sovereignty. While the United States has a different legal stance on the status of the waters of Northwest Passage, it is important to understand that it is not suggesting that it or any other actor has a stronger sovereignty claim than Canada. No one is claiming rival ownership. Instead, the United States government asserts the right for ships and aircraft to transit through Canada’s Arctic waters and the narrow air corridor above them without asking our permission. Canada insists that this right to transit passage does not exist without other actors first securing our permission – which we have the right to refuse if we decide that this activity in our historic internal waters would be against our interests.²

Canada's 2024 Defence Policy Update, Our North, Strong and Free, warns that “Canada's Northwest Passage and the broader Arctic region are already more accessible, and competitors are not waiting to take advantage—seeking access, transportation routes, natural resources, critical minerals, and energy sources through more frequent and regular presence and activity.”³  Does this heightened maritime activity in Canada’s Arctic waters include foreign navies? Which pernicious actors are “exploring Arctic waters and the sea floor, probing our infrastructure and collecting intelligence”? Are these primarily military challenges, or illegal activities that should be countered and prosecuted using law enforcement and diplomatic tools?

Growing international interest in Arctic waters more broadly raises the possibility of non-Arctic states and other actors challenging Canada’s well-established legal position on the status of its Arctic waters. If a hostile foreign government’s warships passed into Canadian waters without our consent, this would certainly constitute a defence and security threat. There is no indication that such incursions are likely to occur in the Canadian Arctic in the near future, however, because there is no plausible scenario in which this would benefit any actor more than it would cost them.

Nevertheless, today’s world is more uncertain and geopolitics more contested than anytime since the end of the Cold War. Since February 2022, strategic rivalry between Russia and the Western democracies, including Canada, has had a negative “spillover” effect on circumpolar cooperation. Nevertheless, there is still little likelihood of armed conflict breaking out between Russia and Canada over Arctic resources, boundary disputes, or regional governance issues. Although Russia has brutally violated the sovereignty of Ukraine in its war against that country, this aggression in Europe does not make Russia more likely to mount a similar attack on Canada or any other Arctic state. It is important to remember that all of the seven like-minded Arctic states are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is the most powerful military alliance that the world has ever seen. For Russia to attack Canada with military force would invoke article 5 of NATO and would immediately trigger a world war. No one desires that outcome, including Russia.

The People’s Republic of China has also emerged as a global competitor – what the United States often refers to as a “pacing threat.” Canadians have been shocked by China’s arbitrary detentions of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor from December 2018 to September 2021, revelations of Beijing’s alleged attempts to interfere in the 2019 and 2021 Canadian federal elections, and China’s violations of human rights at home and internationally. Nonetheless, the Government of Canada has determined that it remains in its interests to work with China on global issues such as climate change mitigation, trade, and global public health. China is also an important market for Canadian commodity and agri-food exports, and its growing consumer market offers further opportunities for Canadian businesses. In a Northern Canadian context, analysts continue to analyze China’s potential desire to undermine Arctic state sovereignty to secure Arctic resources, shipping routes, and influence in regional governance. While media commentary often casually links China’s growing interest in the Circumpolar North with defence and hard security threats, there is no indication that China should be viewed as a direct military competitor in the Canadian Arctic at present or that it is seeking to challenge Canada’s sovereignty in the region in any direct way.⁴

Canada exercises its sovereignty through alliances. Working with key partners like the United States and NATO to defend Canada and North America is an expression of Canada’s sovereignty, because it is our right as a sovereign state to enter such alliances. Working with partners and allies is a source of strength, not a sign of weakness. Accordingly, it is important to avoid narratives – even well-intentioned ones seeking to drum up support for Canadian investments – that suggest our sovereignty is questionable if Canada chooses to defend itself by burden sharing with others. We must be careful not to downplay the strength of our alliances, and the benefits that these bring, when building the case for investments in Canadian sovereignty and security.

Security is different than sovereignty. In practical terms, national security relates to “any action or event that could materially impact the health, safety, security, or economic well-being of Canadians, or the effective functioning of Canada’s governments.”⁵ It is about Canadians being safe, and feeling safe, from threats. While traditional approaches to security focused on military aspects, the Copenhagen School identified the distinctive character and dynamics of security in five sectors: military, political, economic, environmental, and societal.⁶ Adopting this framework prevents analysts from associating all “security” issues with military security and assuming that DND/CAF are responsible for all things security in Canada.

Drawing distinctions between sovereignty and security can help to highlight substantive connects between particular projects and specific DND/CAF funding envelopes. Although the Defence Team itself often seems to conflate ideas of sovereignty, the preservation of territorial integrity, defence against foreign threats across the security spectrum, and domain awareness (with the April 2024 defence policy update a case in point), the territorial governments may find this problematic when it comes to discerning practical ways to align Northerners’ priorities with those of DND/CAF and other specific members of the Defence Team. By focusing on defence and national security in a deliberate and narrower sense, the territorial governments may avoid having its overtures to the Minister of National Defence simply passed along the to more general Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF) table coordinated federally by Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Development Canada (CIRNAC).

Precision in language that speaks directly to the mandates of individual federal departments and agencies might help to facilitate a breakthrough in securing detailed information, support, or partnerships for priority projects.

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Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer  is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He was Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories from 2014-2020 and was reappointed to this position from 2022-2025. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Brian Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University and the Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience, School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Indigenous-state relations. Whitney has (co-) written or (co-) edited more than sixty books and more than one hundred academic articles and chapters.

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1 - CIRNAC, “Arctic and Northern Policy Framework International chapter” (2019), https://rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1562867415721/1562867459588.

2 - For background, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Suzanne Lalonde, and Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon,  Canada and the Maritime Arctic: Boundaries, Shelves, and Waters (Peterborough: North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network , 2020), https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/CanadaMaritimeArctic-PWL-SL-ERD-2020.pdf.

3 - DND, Our North, Strong and Free.

4 - P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse and Ryan Dean, “Why China is Not a Peer Competitor in the Arctic,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 5/5 (2022): 80-97; Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse, Chinese Narratives and Influence in the Circumpolar Arctic: Greenland to the Russian Border (report to the Department of National Defence, submitted February 2023); and Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, “China’s Arctic Gambit? Contemplating Possible Strategies,” NAADSN Policy Brief, April 2020, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20-apr-23-China-Arctic-Gambit-RD-PWL.pdf.

5 - Fasken, “National Security Law,” https://www.fasken.com/en/knowledge/doing-business-canada/2021/10/23-national-security-law.

6 - Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997).

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Business Preamble: Institutional Growth Through Strategic Exit

In the business world, a company’s “exit”—whether through an acquisition, merger, or public offering—often marks the beginning of a new chapter. It’s a moment to celebrate the journey so far and to embrace the opportunity for greater scale, resources, and impact under a larger, and at times, more capable organization. The same logic can be applied to our national institutions: for this example, when the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) “exits” to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) under the Department of National Defence (DND), it’s not just a bureaucratic theory - it’s a strategic evolution. This integration would allow the Coast Guard to amplify its mission, leverage new capabilities, and contribute to national security on a much larger scale, much like a successful business joining forces with a global leader to unlock new potential.

As Canada faces an increasingly complex global security environment, ranging from Arctic sovereignty disputes to shifting strategic alliances, cyber threats, and peer-state naval competition, the need for a more agile, efficient, and robust maritime force has never been more apparent, particularly under international pressure. One bold step to enhance our national readiness is the integration of the CCG under the command structure of the RCN. This move isn’t just about symbolism, narrative, or bureaucracy—it’s about aligning strategy with capability and maximizing every dollar of defense spending.

For background, different models exist for where nations position their Coast Guards – for example, in the US, it is a distinct branch of the armed forces, in Norway the Coast Guard is part of their Navy. The Canadian Coast Guard’s authority stems from the Canadian Coast Guard Act, which established the CCG as a civilian maritime service under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), whereas the Royal Canadian Navy’s authority stems from the National Defence Act. Notwithstanding the potential legislative changes and logistical challenges to accomplish this fundamental change to protecting Canadian and global waters, the benefits of the idea are detailed below.

A Near-Immediate Bump in Canadian Military Spending

With the federal government’s recent announcements of a historic $73 billion investment in defense over the next 20 years, the time is now for structural reforms. Rather than creating parallel tracks for vessel procurement, operations, and training, a unified naval command can streamline budget processes, prevent duplication, and ensure taxpayer dollars are directed toward strategic outcomes. Integrating CCG capabilities into the Navy’s long-term force structure could centralize procurement planning—reducing delivery timelines, increasing interoperability, and leveraging economies of scale.

If Canada were to restructure the Coast Guard under the Department of National Defence (DND), the DND budget would increase by the Coast Guard’s annual budget. This would represent a 7.8% increase in the defense budget, and a bring Canada’s defence spending from 1.31% to 1.41% of GDP¹:

DND budget (2024–25): $30,584,803,954 CAD²

Canadian Coast Guard budget (2024–25): $2,392,000,000 CAD³

“New” DND budget: $30,584,803,954 + $2,392,000,000 = $32,976,803,954 CAD

As of early 2024, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) operates a fleet of 68 marine vessels. This includes: frigates, coastal defence vessels, submarines, Arctic and offshore patrol vessels, patrol vessels, and several auxiliary and support vessels⁴, but no icebreakers (yet).

As of October 2022, the CCG manages and operates a fleet of 123 vessels, including two icebreakers. In addition to its marine fleet, the CCG also operates a small number of air assets. This fleet comprises 22 helicopters, primarily used for ice reconnaissance, personnel transport, and support of maritime operations⁵.

Further to the need for this kind of alignment, the CCG operates its own integrated air assets, whereas the RCN does not. Instead, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) provides air support to the Navy, serving as the command line for all naval air operations. Integrating these structures presents an opportunity to better align and utilize air resources across Canada’s maritime and naval forces, and this is something for the RCAF and RCN to review and possibly adopt.

A True North Force Multiplier

Canada’s Coast Guard operates a fleet of highly capable vessels, which is manned by skilled professionals whose core expertise is search and rescue, icebreaking, and environmental response. Under a unified command, the operational strengths of both the RCN and CCG personnel and assets could be leveraged, creating a force that can scale up in times of crisis, whether domestic or international. Coast Guard experience and reach give new latitude and command opportunities, while Navy personnel bring combat and expeditionary specialization. This synergy strengthens Canada’s ability to respond to evolving and complex maritime threats.

The Coast Guard has year-round presence in three Northern communities. Having established their Arctic Region offices and their Arctic Strategy, they are patrolling, undertaking joint exercises and providing the essential services for Arctic marine response. The activities and strategy that the Coast Guard undertakes need not change with the re-housing of the agency, but can simply be added to Navy activities as part of ongoing business and building the presence in the North.

Importantly, integration would also address the universality of service, ensuring that all personnel, regardless of their initial background —whether uniformed or civilian —are prepared to serve in a wide range of roles as operational needs dictate. This is somewhat consistent with the current utilization of civilian roles throughout DND, where civilians already fill essential positions, including some operational functions. It’s been done before. For example, civilians serve as intelligence analysts, logistics coordinators, cyber security specialists, research scientists at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)⁶ , and air traffic controllers on military bases. Additionally, civilian employees are often embedded within operational planning teams, support the maintenance and operation of military equipment, and provide critical expertise in areas such as procurement, engineering, and communications. These roles demonstrate the vital contribution of civilians to both the day-to-day and operational effectiveness of the Canadian Armed Forces.

By adopting a more universal approach to service, the unified organization could maximize flexibility and operational effectiveness, drawing on the full spectrum of talent and expertise across both civilian and uniformed members. While there could be concern and anxiety from the uniformed and civilian members, change is the only constant and addressing current and future needs may require some discomfort to achieve the mission – something that can be addresses and managed with a coordinated strategic exit. Through an integration between the Coast Guard and Navy, a new wave of recruitment can be triggered. A merged organization can offer broader career tracks—from humanitarian missions and search and rescue to combat and national defence, making maritime service more attractive to the next generation of Canadians.

By viewing the Coast Guard’s integration into the RNC as a strategic “exit” into a new, more impactful structure, we can celebrate the expanded opportunities, resources, and national security benefits that come from joining forces under the CAF umbrella. Now is the time for Canada to embrace bold reform and ensure our maritime security and sovereignty for generations to come.

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Arjun Grewal is the CEO of Ventus Respiratory Technologies and serves as an Industry contributor to the Canadian Institute of Arctic Security (CIAS). With a distinguished 20-year career in the Canadian Armed Forces, including 13 years with Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, Arjun has extensive experience in global operations, leadership, enterprise business, and innovation. He has held senior roles in both technology and defence sectors and is recognized for his commitment to advancing National security, technological innovation, and cross-sector collaboration in Canada’s North.

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1 - 2023-24 defence spend was 1.31%, with a 7.8% increase to the Navy budget, the GDP contribution grows to 1.41%.

2 - Canada Spends: https://canadaspends.com/en/spending/national-defence

3 - Canadian Coast Guard Integrated Business and Human Resource Plan 2024 to 2025 through 2026 to 2027: https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/publications/corporation-information-organisation/ibhrp-piarh/2024-2027/index-eng.html

4 - Royal Canadian Navy: https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/who-we-are.html

5 - Canadian Coast Guard: https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/fleet-flotte/index-eng.html

6 - Defence Research and Development Canada: https://www.canada.ca/en/defence-research-development.html

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