Commentary

Allegedly imminent threats to Canadian sovereignty and security are often overblown in the national news media. Despite consistent messaging from Global Affairs Canada that our country’s “Arctic sovereignty is longstanding and well established”¹ and that our regional boundary disputes are well-managed and do not pose any security threats, Canadians are inundated with myths about our Arctic sovereignty being much more precarious than it is. This reinforces a deep-seated – and ill-founded – sense of insecurity about our Arctic sovereignty.

Canada’s sovereignty is rooted in its people. The North is a homeland which Indigenous peoples have inhabited since time immemorial. Through government-to-government relations rooted in mutual respect, recognition of Indigenous and treaty rights, and shared responsibilities articulated in land claims and other relationships, Indigenous peoples partner with the Canadian state in the exercise of sovereignty.

In its conventional definition, sovereignty is the internationally recognized right to control activities within a particular jurisdiction. In Canada’s case, no rival international actor suggests that it has a better claim to ownership of the lands or waters of the Yukon, NWT, and Nunavut. The Government of Canada has long maintained the legal position that our historic internal waters in our part of the Arctic, often referred to as the Northwest Passage, are subject to Canada’s full sovereignty. While the United States has a different legal stance on the status of the waters of Northwest Passage, it is important to understand that it is not suggesting that it or any other actor has a stronger sovereignty claim than Canada. No one is claiming rival ownership. Instead, the United States government asserts the right for ships and aircraft to transit through Canada’s Arctic waters and the narrow air corridor above them without asking our permission. Canada insists that this right to transit passage does not exist without other actors first securing our permission – which we have the right to refuse if we decide that this activity in our historic internal waters would be against our interests.²

Canada's 2024 Defence Policy Update, Our North, Strong and Free, warns that “Canada's Northwest Passage and the broader Arctic region are already more accessible, and competitors are not waiting to take advantage—seeking access, transportation routes, natural resources, critical minerals, and energy sources through more frequent and regular presence and activity.”³  Does this heightened maritime activity in Canada’s Arctic waters include foreign navies? Which pernicious actors are “exploring Arctic waters and the sea floor, probing our infrastructure and collecting intelligence”? Are these primarily military challenges, or illegal activities that should be countered and prosecuted using law enforcement and diplomatic tools?

Growing international interest in Arctic waters more broadly raises the possibility of non-Arctic states and other actors challenging Canada’s well-established legal position on the status of its Arctic waters. If a hostile foreign government’s warships passed into Canadian waters without our consent, this would certainly constitute a defence and security threat. There is no indication that such incursions are likely to occur in the Canadian Arctic in the near future, however, because there is no plausible scenario in which this would benefit any actor more than it would cost them.

Nevertheless, today’s world is more uncertain and geopolitics more contested than anytime since the end of the Cold War. Since February 2022, strategic rivalry between Russia and the Western democracies, including Canada, has had a negative “spillover” effect on circumpolar cooperation. Nevertheless, there is still little likelihood of armed conflict breaking out between Russia and Canada over Arctic resources, boundary disputes, or regional governance issues. Although Russia has brutally violated the sovereignty of Ukraine in its war against that country, this aggression in Europe does not make Russia more likely to mount a similar attack on Canada or any other Arctic state. It is important to remember that all of the seven like-minded Arctic states are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is the most powerful military alliance that the world has ever seen. For Russia to attack Canada with military force would invoke article 5 of NATO and would immediately trigger a world war. No one desires that outcome, including Russia.

The People’s Republic of China has also emerged as a global competitor – what the United States often refers to as a “pacing threat.” Canadians have been shocked by China’s arbitrary detentions of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor from December 2018 to September 2021, revelations of Beijing’s alleged attempts to interfere in the 2019 and 2021 Canadian federal elections, and China’s violations of human rights at home and internationally. Nonetheless, the Government of Canada has determined that it remains in its interests to work with China on global issues such as climate change mitigation, trade, and global public health. China is also an important market for Canadian commodity and agri-food exports, and its growing consumer market offers further opportunities for Canadian businesses. In a Northern Canadian context, analysts continue to analyze China’s potential desire to undermine Arctic state sovereignty to secure Arctic resources, shipping routes, and influence in regional governance. While media commentary often casually links China’s growing interest in the Circumpolar North with defence and hard security threats, there is no indication that China should be viewed as a direct military competitor in the Canadian Arctic at present or that it is seeking to challenge Canada’s sovereignty in the region in any direct way.⁴

Canada exercises its sovereignty through alliances. Working with key partners like the United States and NATO to defend Canada and North America is an expression of Canada’s sovereignty, because it is our right as a sovereign state to enter such alliances. Working with partners and allies is a source of strength, not a sign of weakness. Accordingly, it is important to avoid narratives – even well-intentioned ones seeking to drum up support for Canadian investments – that suggest our sovereignty is questionable if Canada chooses to defend itself by burden sharing with others. We must be careful not to downplay the strength of our alliances, and the benefits that these bring, when building the case for investments in Canadian sovereignty and security.

Security is different than sovereignty. In practical terms, national security relates to “any action or event that could materially impact the health, safety, security, or economic well-being of Canadians, or the effective functioning of Canada’s governments.”⁵ It is about Canadians being safe, and feeling safe, from threats. While traditional approaches to security focused on military aspects, the Copenhagen School identified the distinctive character and dynamics of security in five sectors: military, political, economic, environmental, and societal.⁶ Adopting this framework prevents analysts from associating all “security” issues with military security and assuming that DND/CAF are responsible for all things security in Canada.

Drawing distinctions between sovereignty and security can help to highlight substantive connects between particular projects and specific DND/CAF funding envelopes. Although the Defence Team itself often seems to conflate ideas of sovereignty, the preservation of territorial integrity, defence against foreign threats across the security spectrum, and domain awareness (with the April 2024 defence policy update a case in point), the territorial governments may find this problematic when it comes to discerning practical ways to align Northerners’ priorities with those of DND/CAF and other specific members of the Defence Team. By focusing on defence and national security in a deliberate and narrower sense, the territorial governments may avoid having its overtures to the Minister of National Defence simply passed along the to more general Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF) table coordinated federally by Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Development Canada (CIRNAC).

Precision in language that speaks directly to the mandates of individual federal departments and agencies might help to facilitate a breakthrough in securing detailed information, support, or partnerships for priority projects.

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Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer  is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He was Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories from 2014-2020 and was reappointed to this position from 2022-2025. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Brian Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University and the Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience, School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Indigenous-state relations. Whitney has (co-) written or (co-) edited more than sixty books and more than one hundred academic articles and chapters.

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1 - CIRNAC, “Arctic and Northern Policy Framework International chapter” (2019), https://rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1562867415721/1562867459588.

2 - For background, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Suzanne Lalonde, and Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon,  Canada and the Maritime Arctic: Boundaries, Shelves, and Waters (Peterborough: North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network , 2020), https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/CanadaMaritimeArctic-PWL-SL-ERD-2020.pdf.

3 - DND, Our North, Strong and Free.

4 - P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse and Ryan Dean, “Why China is Not a Peer Competitor in the Arctic,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 5/5 (2022): 80-97; Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse, Chinese Narratives and Influence in the Circumpolar Arctic: Greenland to the Russian Border (report to the Department of National Defence, submitted February 2023); and Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, “China’s Arctic Gambit? Contemplating Possible Strategies,” NAADSN Policy Brief, April 2020, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20-apr-23-China-Arctic-Gambit-RD-PWL.pdf.

5 - Fasken, “National Security Law,” https://www.fasken.com/en/knowledge/doing-business-canada/2021/10/23-national-security-law.

6 - Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997).

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Business Preamble: Institutional Growth Through Strategic Exit

In the business world, a company’s “exit”—whether through an acquisition, merger, or public offering—often marks the beginning of a new chapter. It’s a moment to celebrate the journey so far and to embrace the opportunity for greater scale, resources, and impact under a larger, and at times, more capable organization. The same logic can be applied to our national institutions: for this example, when the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) “exits” to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) under the Department of National Defence (DND), it’s not just a bureaucratic theory - it’s a strategic evolution. This integration would allow the Coast Guard to amplify its mission, leverage new capabilities, and contribute to national security on a much larger scale, much like a successful business joining forces with a global leader to unlock new potential.

As Canada faces an increasingly complex global security environment, ranging from Arctic sovereignty disputes to shifting strategic alliances, cyber threats, and peer-state naval competition, the need for a more agile, efficient, and robust maritime force has never been more apparent, particularly under international pressure. One bold step to enhance our national readiness is the integration of the CCG under the command structure of the RCN. This move isn’t just about symbolism, narrative, or bureaucracy—it’s about aligning strategy with capability and maximizing every dollar of defense spending.

For background, different models exist for where nations position their Coast Guards – for example, in the US, it is a distinct branch of the armed forces, in Norway the Coast Guard is part of their Navy. The Canadian Coast Guard’s authority stems from the Canadian Coast Guard Act, which established the CCG as a civilian maritime service under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), whereas the Royal Canadian Navy’s authority stems from the National Defence Act. Notwithstanding the potential legislative changes and logistical challenges to accomplish this fundamental change to protecting Canadian and global waters, the benefits of the idea are detailed below.

A Near-Immediate Bump in Canadian Military Spending

With the federal government’s recent announcements of a historic $73 billion investment in defense over the next 20 years, the time is now for structural reforms. Rather than creating parallel tracks for vessel procurement, operations, and training, a unified naval command can streamline budget processes, prevent duplication, and ensure taxpayer dollars are directed toward strategic outcomes. Integrating CCG capabilities into the Navy’s long-term force structure could centralize procurement planning—reducing delivery timelines, increasing interoperability, and leveraging economies of scale.

If Canada were to restructure the Coast Guard under the Department of National Defence (DND), the DND budget would increase by the Coast Guard’s annual budget. This would represent a 7.8% increase in the defense budget, and a bring Canada’s defence spending from 1.31% to 1.41% of GDP¹:

DND budget (2024–25): $30,584,803,954 CAD²

Canadian Coast Guard budget (2024–25): $2,392,000,000 CAD³

“New” DND budget: $30,584,803,954 + $2,392,000,000 = $32,976,803,954 CAD

As of early 2024, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) operates a fleet of 68 marine vessels. This includes: frigates, coastal defence vessels, submarines, Arctic and offshore patrol vessels, patrol vessels, and several auxiliary and support vessels⁴, but no icebreakers (yet).

As of October 2022, the CCG manages and operates a fleet of 123 vessels, including two icebreakers. In addition to its marine fleet, the CCG also operates a small number of air assets. This fleet comprises 22 helicopters, primarily used for ice reconnaissance, personnel transport, and support of maritime operations⁵.

Further to the need for this kind of alignment, the CCG operates its own integrated air assets, whereas the RCN does not. Instead, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) provides air support to the Navy, serving as the command line for all naval air operations. Integrating these structures presents an opportunity to better align and utilize air resources across Canada’s maritime and naval forces, and this is something for the RCAF and RCN to review and possibly adopt.

A True North Force Multiplier

Canada’s Coast Guard operates a fleet of highly capable vessels, which is manned by skilled professionals whose core expertise is search and rescue, icebreaking, and environmental response. Under a unified command, the operational strengths of both the RCN and CCG personnel and assets could be leveraged, creating a force that can scale up in times of crisis, whether domestic or international. Coast Guard experience and reach give new latitude and command opportunities, while Navy personnel bring combat and expeditionary specialization. This synergy strengthens Canada’s ability to respond to evolving and complex maritime threats.

The Coast Guard has year-round presence in three Northern communities. Having established their Arctic Region offices and their Arctic Strategy, they are patrolling, undertaking joint exercises and providing the essential services for Arctic marine response. The activities and strategy that the Coast Guard undertakes need not change with the re-housing of the agency, but can simply be added to Navy activities as part of ongoing business and building the presence in the North.

Importantly, integration would also address the universality of service, ensuring that all personnel, regardless of their initial background —whether uniformed or civilian —are prepared to serve in a wide range of roles as operational needs dictate. This is somewhat consistent with the current utilization of civilian roles throughout DND, where civilians already fill essential positions, including some operational functions. It’s been done before. For example, civilians serve as intelligence analysts, logistics coordinators, cyber security specialists, research scientists at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)⁶ , and air traffic controllers on military bases. Additionally, civilian employees are often embedded within operational planning teams, support the maintenance and operation of military equipment, and provide critical expertise in areas such as procurement, engineering, and communications. These roles demonstrate the vital contribution of civilians to both the day-to-day and operational effectiveness of the Canadian Armed Forces.

By adopting a more universal approach to service, the unified organization could maximize flexibility and operational effectiveness, drawing on the full spectrum of talent and expertise across both civilian and uniformed members. While there could be concern and anxiety from the uniformed and civilian members, change is the only constant and addressing current and future needs may require some discomfort to achieve the mission – something that can be addresses and managed with a coordinated strategic exit. Through an integration between the Coast Guard and Navy, a new wave of recruitment can be triggered. A merged organization can offer broader career tracks—from humanitarian missions and search and rescue to combat and national defence, making maritime service more attractive to the next generation of Canadians.

By viewing the Coast Guard’s integration into the RNC as a strategic “exit” into a new, more impactful structure, we can celebrate the expanded opportunities, resources, and national security benefits that come from joining forces under the CAF umbrella. Now is the time for Canada to embrace bold reform and ensure our maritime security and sovereignty for generations to come.

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Arjun Grewal is the CEO of Ventus Respiratory Technologies and serves as an Industry contributor to the Canadian Institute of Arctic Security (CIAS). With a distinguished 20-year career in the Canadian Armed Forces, including 13 years with Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, Arjun has extensive experience in global operations, leadership, enterprise business, and innovation. He has held senior roles in both technology and defence sectors and is recognized for his commitment to advancing National security, technological innovation, and cross-sector collaboration in Canada’s North.

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1 - 2023-24 defence spend was 1.31%, with a 7.8% increase to the Navy budget, the GDP contribution grows to 1.41%.

2 - Canada Spends: https://canadaspends.com/en/spending/national-defence

3 - Canadian Coast Guard Integrated Business and Human Resource Plan 2024 to 2025 through 2026 to 2027: https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/publications/corporation-information-organisation/ibhrp-piarh/2024-2027/index-eng.html

4 - Royal Canadian Navy: https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/who-we-are.html

5 - Canadian Coast Guard: https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/fleet-flotte/index-eng.html

6 - Defence Research and Development Canada: https://www.canada.ca/en/defence-research-development.html

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Part II – Securing Sovereignty from Within

The first part of this series examined Canada’s diplomatic outreach and military reinforcement as essential pillars in asserting sovereignty over the Northwest Passage (NWP). Yet, securing control over the Arctic requires more than external signaling or defence posture. This second part turns to the internal dimensions of national strategy - public mobilization and economic development. These elements are critical for anchoring Canada’s Arctic policy in civic legitimacy and material presence. By cultivating public ownership of the NWP and investing in infrastructure and sustainable growth, Ottawa can reinforce its claims through both national resolve and economic integration.

Public mobilization

National support is critical to sustaining sovereignty efforts. Yet, the NWP remains abstract to many Canadians, overshadowed by domestic concerns (1). The Government of Canada must bridge this gap, fostering a sense of ownership over the Arctic. Public campaigns could take varied forms: town halls in major cities in southern Canada explaining the NWP’s strategic value, documentaries highlighting Inuit contributions to Canada’s northern identity, or social media initiatives targeting younger audiences (2). Community events in the North, like cultural showcases, could ground the issue locally.

Historical examples reveal how state-led civic engagement campaigns can shape national consciousness and reinforce territorial claims, particularly in contested geopolitical spaces. In some cases, governments have strategically used education, media, and cultural diplomacy to consolidate public consensus on issues of sovereignty - transforming abstract geographic disputes into matters of identity and collective memory. While the political systems and rhetorical strategies differ, such approaches underscore a universal truth: territorial legitimacy is not only asserted through legal argument or military posture but also through sustained domestic affirmation. For Canada, fostering a similar civic foundation through curriculum reform, documentary storytelling, and national dialogue could entrench public ownership of the Northwest Passage as a sovereign space. Grounding Arctic sovereignty in cultural legitimacy and public memory would complement diplomatic and defence efforts, reinforcing Canada’s claims from within.

Economic development

The NWP’s strategic importance is matched by its economic potential. As Arctic routes open, global shipping firms' eye shorter paths between Asia and Europe (3). Canada, however, lacks the infrastructure (ports, roads, and railways) to link the NWP to southern markets (4). Without investment, Ottawa forfeits revenue and weakens its territorial claim.

Building northern infrastructure is a priority. Establishing deep-water ports along the NWP would support trade and assert control (5). Supply depots could sustain maritime traffic, creating local jobs. Yet, the Arctic’s sparse population limits progress. Canada could address this by working in partnership with Indigenous governments to incentivize sustainable community development and economic activity in Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and Yukon through targeted investments, housing support, and workforce development programs. Tax breaks, housing subsidies, and training programs might attract workers, including immigrants eager for opportunity. Historical migrations, like the Klondike gold rush, show how economic promise drives growth (6).Ottawa could replicate this pull, tailored to modern needs and socio-economic responsibilities.

Private and international investment is equally vital. Canada should court firms in shipping, mining, or renewable energy - Japan, Germany, or South Korea, for instance, value stable trade corridors. Russia’s success in securing UAE funds for Arctic projects proves such partnerships are feasible (7). Ottawa could offer tax incentives or streamlined permits to draw capital, ensuring projects align with environmental and Indigenous priorities. A developed North solidifies Canada’s presence, making its sovereignty tangible.

Conclusion

The Arctic’s future is unfolding rapidly. Ice retreat and rising stakes demand action. The United States under new leadership since January 2025, may prioritize its own Arctic ambitions, complicating ties with Ottawa. Canada faces trade and financial frictions with Washington, but the NWP dispute overshadows them all (8). Senator Poirier’s 1907 call to claim the Arctic resonates; a reminder that hesitation invites others to shape the rules.

Ottawa’s strategy must integrate four dimensions. Diplomatic outreach aligns allies and clarifies the stakes. Military upgrades deter challenges while signaling resolve. Public mobilization builds national will, rooting the NWP in Canada’s identity. Economic investment strengthens the Arctic as a dynamic and strategically integrated region, reinforcing Ottawa’s authority and long-term presence. Together, these steps counter the risk of misalignment with the U.S. and beyond. Failure to act could cede not just the NWP but North America’s northern security. Canada has the tools, now it must use them.

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Abbas Qaidari is an independent international security analyst based in British Columbia, and former senior fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies. His analyses have appeared in High North News, Policy Options, Al-Monitor, the Atlantic Council and many U.S. based platforms.

E: Qaidariabbas@gmail.com
X: https://x.com/AbbasQaidari

PART II REFERENCES:

(1) https:/gordonfoundation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/APO_Survey_Volume-2_WEB.pdf

(2) https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100014187/1534785248701

(3) https://arcticportal.org/shipping-portlet/shipping-routes

(4) https://www.stantec.com/en/ideas/topic/mobility/connecting-canadian-arctic-through-infrastructure-indigenous-knowledge

(5) https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/grays-bay-port-arctic-road-1.7249708

(6) https://www.nps.gov/klgo/learn/goldrush.htm

(7) https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/expanding-horizons-uaes-strategic-foray-arctic/

(8) https://thoughtleadership.rbc.com/a-us-canada-trade-shock-first-economic-takeaways/

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Part I - Diplomacy and deterrence in the Northwest Passage

The Arctic’s geopolitical landscape is shifting. Rapid ice melt exposes vast mineral deposits and new shipping routes, is drawing intense global interest. Reports suggest the United States and Russia may explore bilateral agreements to exploit Arctic resources, potentially sidelining Canada and Nordic states (1). Whether substantiated or not, such prospects signal a broader challenge for Canada: safeguarding its sovereignty over the Northwest Passage (NWP), a waterway Canada claims as internal but the U.S. regards as an international strait (2-3). The disagreement escalated in2019 during a high-level Arctic Council meeting, when Mike Pompeo, the Secretary of State under the first Trump administration, described Canada’s claim over the Northwest Passage as “illegitimate” (4).

However, Canada reaffirmed its claim over the Northwest Passage in its Arctic Foreign Policy, released in 2024, stating: 'Canada will maintain strong defence capabilities in its internal Arctic waters, including in the Northwest Passage' (5).

This disagreement, rooted in decades of legal and strategic tension, risks escalation if unaddressed. Canada cannot rely on goodwill or past alliances to protect its interests. Drawing on the legacy of Senator Pascal Poirier, who championed Arctic ownership as early as 1907, Ottawa must pursue a robust strategy encompassing diplomacy, military posture, public mobilization, and economic development to assert control over the NWP and counter emerging threats (6).

Diplomatic engagement

Resolving the NWP dispute demands proactive diplomacy, particularly with Washington. Canada has historical precedent to build upon. In 1907, Senator Pascal Poirier proposed four legal claims to assert Canada’s Arctic and NWP sovereignty, including the so-called ‘Sector Theory’, laying a rhetorical foundation for future efforts (7). By the 1980s, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s government advanced this cause, presenting legal and historical arguments during negotiations that produced the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement (8). Though the U.S. never endorsed Canada’s position, those talks underscored Ottawa’s determination.

Canada should now initiate high-level discussions with U.S. counterparts. The strategic case is compelling: recognizing the NWP as Canadian waters strengthens North American security. While Canada and the U.S. collaborate closely under North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) for continental defence, recent shifts in U.S. policy - such as the 2025 Executive Order on Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance, which in Section 18 pledges to "ensure the security and leadership of Arctic waterways" - signal a more assertive American posture (9). Leaving the NWP designated as an international strait not only invites strategic ambiguity but also risks eroding Canada's sovereignty over a critical northern passage. Russia, with its unmatched Arctic fleet, or China, which labels itself a “near-Arctic state,” could deploy vessels for reconnaissance under freedom-of-navigation principles (10). Ottawa must emphasize that a secure NWP benefits both nations, preventing hostile access to North America’s northern flank. Direct talks could revisit the 1988 framework, seeking mutual concessions to align interests.

Engagement should extend beyond the U.S. Canada shares Arctic priorities with Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. Convening a regional dialogue or issuing joint statements on territorial integrity would amplify Ottawa’s position, reinforcing its claims without isolating Washington (11). Diplomacy must balance firmness with collaboration to avoid missteps.

Military reinforcement

Sovereignty requires credible defence capabilities. Canada has outlined plans to expand Arctic infrastructure, new bases, radar stations, and patrol vessels but implementation lags (12). The NWP needs fortified defences: coastal surveillance systems, drone units for real-time monitoring, and fighter squadrons positioned for rapid response. Russia’s Arctic dominance, marked by advanced icebreakers and outposts, sets a high bar (13). While Canada need not match this scale, it must deter challenges by establishing a credible presence, even amid occasional policy divergence with close allies like the U.S.

Ottawa’s shift toward European defence suppliers is pragmatic, possibly enabling faster procurement of ships, aircraft, and systems to bolster the Canadian Armed Forces (14). Conducting joint military exercises with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners near the NWP - particularly with Denmark, given the Kingdom’s security responsibility for Greenland - as well as with Norway, France, or the U.K. would demonstrate resolve. These maneuvers, carefully coordinated to complement NORAD commitments, project strength and multilateral support. For example, a combined naval drill in Baffin Bay could test the ability of the forces to operate together while signaling Canada’s vigilance. Military enhancements are not about confrontation but about ensuring Ottawa’s claims are respected in a contested region.

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Abbas Qaidari is an independent international security analyst based in British Columbia, and former senior fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies. His analyses have appeared in High North News, Policy Options, Al-Monitor, the Atlantic Council and many U.S.-based platforms.

E: Qaidariabbas@gmail.com
X: https://x.com/AbbasQaidari

PART I REFERENCES:

(1) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-26/us-russia-mull-cooperation-on-arctic-trade-routes-exploration

(2) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XW6otNpfOWw

(3) https://brownpoliticalreview.org/the-u-s-canada-northwest-passage-dispute/

(4) https://www.ibanet.org/article/3eeb2f4f-abc9-4944-a1cd-2908cc83a827

(5) https:/www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/assets/pdfs/publications/arctic-arctique/arctic-policy-politique-en.pdf

(6) https://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/article/canadian-claims-to-territorial-sovereignty-in-the-arctic-regions/

(7) https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/brief-history-lines-arctic/

(8) https://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=101701

(9) https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/restoring-americas-maritime-dominance/

(10) https://www.rand.org/pubs/articles/2022/what-does-chinas-arctic-presence-mean-to-the-us.html

(11) https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/first-canada-nordic-strategic-dialogue-key-safer-future-us-region

(12) https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/canadas-arctic-ascendancy-leading-west-shifting-north

(13) https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/russia-china-artic-sea-nato-2ca1ea10

(14) https://apnews.com/article/canada-defense-european-union-trump-f35-b2ced39c577c8dff6d3718007440db5c

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Relations between Canada and the United States are, to put it mildly, strained. But despite all the angry rhetoric, neither country will be able to ignore the perennial truth that our geography matters to the defence of both nations.

Most North Americans perceive our place on the planet through historical projections that place North America in the centre, Europe on the right, and Asia on the left. These maps give the impression that Canada is isolated, with the United States and the three oceans as our only neighbours.

Historically, Russia (or the Soviet Union in the previous century) has been the most significant threat to the defence of the United States and Canada. Given our Mercator projection informed imaginations, it might seem that the way to the United States from Russia involves an eastward or a westward “attack” over either the Pacific or Atlantic Oceans. This view places Canada largely out of the fray of any great power competition.

However, a polar projection, looking down on the earth from a point above the North Pole, changes our perception of the relationship between Canada, the United States, and Russia: if we get ‘above the globe,’ Canada is effectively in the middle.

By far the shortest routes from Russia to the contiguous United States – also called the “Lower 48” – are over Canada. These are the routes that were of most importance at the start of the Cold War and were the reason that the United States and Canada formed the North American Air Defense Command in 1958, later named the North American Aerospace Defense Command(NORAD). The Canadian and U.S. governments established the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, a significant defensive radar line from Alaska, along the Arctic periphery of Canada and across Greenland, as well as a pair of successive East-West radar lines across the ‘middle’ of Canada. These radars were the eyes and ears of NORAD for almost 40 years, allowing NORAD to deter Soviet and Russian bombers from threatening the continent. Canada and the United States set up these defences across the North because that was the best way to protect critical infrastructure located to the south.

Things have changed a lot since the 1950s. First, ballistic missiles replaced bombers as the dominant threat. Then the bombers were armed with cruise missiles instead of gravity bombs. Today’s threats include advanced and hypersonic missiles launched from the air, ships, submarines, or ground launchers. These new cruise missiles travel through the air – more like airplanes than rockets or ballistic missiles – but with advanced navigation, greater range, electronic warfare and stealth-like capabilities and in the case of the hypersonics, much higher speed. At the same time, of course, there are real threats posed by disinformation and other types of hybrid warfare.

But while the threats have changed, the geography remains the same.

And for the record, as Chinese military capability grows and presents a threat, the same geography applies; Canada is in between the United States and their adversaries – China or Russia.

Canada’s position on the northern flank of the United States, and on the shortest direct path to the U.S. from either Russia or China, matters to the defence and security of America today, but in new, modern ways.

For America’s main adversaries, using cruise missiles of whatever generation or capability launched from bomber aircraft, the shortest, quickest, most dangerous avenue of approach and attack will forever be over Canada. While the technologies of the day have evolved, it will always be necessary to “block this route” or deter Russia and China from such an attack. Just because there are now other means to launch an assault, it would be a significant mistake to assume that “they won’t attack that way.” For these “over-the-pole attacks,” new technology can provide better ways to “close off” the northern flank from the modern threats, and Canada needs to follow through on its NORAD Modernization efforts to do so. NORAD Modernization allows Canada, based on its critical geography, to better protect the United States (and itself) from increasingly sophisticated capabilities.

In a more general sense, in today’s complex threat environment, Canada’s position on the northern flank of the United States elevates Canada’s connections relative to America’s defence and security. While United States President Donald Trump’s Iron Dome (or Golden Dome) initiative is aimed at ensuring the U.S. homeland is protected from attacks, a safe and secure America extends as well to threats along the U.S. northern border. As Canada defends itself from attack it also secures the United States’ northern border. Looked at a different way, based on geography, the United States leverages Canada to secure its northern border, the northern flank of America’s defences.

Whether it is air defences or other threats, many countries of the world do not share a border with a friendly or cooperating neighbour, so it may seem that Canada and the United States have alternatives for their self-defences. On one hand, this is true: while it would be less effective and cost more, Canada and the United States could independently assume the defences of their territories and their nations. However, those other neighbouring countries are not placed directly between two nuclear armed, superpower adversaries. Canadians may wish that it was otherwise, but the truth is that Canada occupies prime real estate of considerable interest to the United States in matters of defence.

Canada’s geography brings with it some special responsibilities, as well as opportunities. First and foremost, Americans will be most interested in ensuring Canada contributes to the defence and security of the United States. Given the unchangeable geography, it will always be better if Canada and the United States cooperate on their defences.

Looking down on the Earth makes it apparent that the defences of Canada and the United States are intertwined. This vantage point gives a clear view to the historic and enduring factors that make co-operation on defence in each nation’s best interest. For decades, Canadians and Americans have worked shoulder to shoulder under NORAD to meet these requirements for defence of our countries, but as the world changes the defences need to adapt. What doesn’t change are the geographic realities that make us neighbours and partners.

Canadian and American administrations may struggle to find common ground on trade or any number of issues affecting their citizens’ shared lives on the continent, but in matters of defence and security we will always be bound by our geography. In considering our long-term relationship, Canadians and Americans need to understand that their defence and their security are mutually dependent and interconnected.

Lt.-Gen. (Ret’d) Christopher Coates is Director of National Defence and Foreign Policy at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

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In the current, intense debate about Canadian sovereignty and national defence, the Yukon once again finds itself at the forefront of the conversation. With US President Donald Trump making a series of intemperate and uncalled for threats to Canada’s national sovereignty, the country is tasked to take unprecedented steps to protects its territorial integrity. Canada is also paying the price for decades of neglect of its northern flank.

The nation has been down this path before. In 1870, Canada purchased the vast and unceded lands of Rupertsland from the Hudson’s Bay Company, a transaction facilitated by a British government that was eager to rid itself of its administrative responsibilities for the northern half of British North America. For a quarter of a century, the new country did virtually nothing to assume its obligations for this new territory.  Only in 1894, and then at the urging of Bishop William Carpenter Bompas of the Church Missionary Society, did the Canadian government send a small group from the North West Mounted Police to determine the need to enforce Canadian law in the Fortymile region of the Yukon.  

The timing of this investigative expedition, and the subsequent decision to place a regular establishment in the borderlands mining camp, proved extremely fortuitous. Canada had a police force, albeit small, in the region when gold was discovered in the Klondike in 1896. They brought legal formality and structure to a potentially chaotic frontier mining camp, establishing respect for law and order before the massive influx in the 1897-1898 stampede.

As the prospectors and camp followers flooded into the region and as the Yukon River basin quickly became one of the richest and most famous places on earth, Canada’s concerns escalated. Most of the stampeders came from the United States. They brought with them the aggressive attitudes of the American resource frontier, moderated by their collective vulnerability to the extreme cold and isolation of the Canadian Northwest. The NWMP proved effective in enforcing Canadian laws and mining regulations but the cultural assertiveness of the mining community, the size of the American population, and the increasing US interest in the Klondike worried Canada authorities.

Canada was ill-placed to respond to this unanticipated threat to Canadian sovereignty. The country had no standing army but there was a small militia. The Government of Canada resolved to send 200 soldiers, named the Yukon Field Force, to establish a base at Fort Selkirk and to re-enforce Canadian authority in the region. The heavily equipped unit made the lengthy journey to the Yukon, travelling along the Stikine River to avoid having to go to the Yukon through the United States.

The American threat proved more illusory than real. The gold rush slowed by 1899 and the need for the Field Force quickly declined. The militia was moved out, in stages, between 1899 and 1900, with some of the militiamen deployed to support the British war with the Boers in South Africa. It is not that the US had lost interest in the region. The Americans discovered that they got most of what they wanted out of the Klondike – particularly gold and business opportunities – without annexing or occupying the gold fields.  

The Canadian Northwest found itself again on the front lines of continent defence during World War II, particularly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The construction of the Northwest Staging Route through the Yukon started before 1941 and proved to be only the start of the wartime occupation of the Northwest. The Staging Route was followed in 1942 by the construction of the hastily planned Alaska Highway. The parallel development CANOL pipeline and Whitehorse oil refinery placed the Yukon in the centre of military preparations in the region. 

The burst of activity faded quickly, for the American victory at the battle of Midway in June 1942 eliminated much of the Japanese threat and resulted in the quick roll-back of American military and construction activity in the Yukon. The Northwest was left with a highway that was poorly located and far from complete. The pipeline and refinery closed soon after the end of the war. 

These events – the Gold Rush and the defence of Alaska and the Northwest during World War II – demonstrated the vulnerability of Canada’s Northern flank and the costs of inadequate national preparations for the protection of the area. But the lessons were poorly learned. After World War II, Canada relied on American military protection throughout the Cold War and slowly dismantled the country’s northern military strength. By the 1970s, the Canadian military establishment in the area had all but disappeared, with the country sheltered by the NORAD defence systems and with little on-the-ground presence.

Canada finds itself, at the end of the first quarter of the 21^st century, once again ill-prepared for the geopolitical challenges of our age. And the Yukon, much as in the late 19^th century, finds itself once more on the front lines of the effort to assert and protect Canadian sovereignty. Perhaps the next few years will see the establishment of a contemporary version of the Yukon Field Force – a regular, substantial North-based military establishment that goes beyond showing the flag and demonstrates Canada’s determination to defend the Far North. Maybe, just maybe, Canada will finally learn one of the North’s most important lessons: that neglecting the region leaves it vulnerable to external dangers and stops Canada from the vital work of completing Confederation in the territorial North.