Commentary

Purpose

To describe processes and expectations for written and multimedia submissions to the Canadian Institute for Arctic Security (CIAS).

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Quick guide

1. Alignment with the CIAS vision and mission

2. Contributors

- Diverse voices from the Canadian North

3. Types of Content

- Written: Short (500-1,500 words) and long (2,000+words)

- Video/Audio: Interviews, speeches, event sessions

4. Submission Process

- Contact CIAS: Email cias@yukon.ca

- Format: Written (.docx); video/audio (contact CIAS)

5. Review

- Peer Review: Anonymous review at discretion of CIAS

- Approval: Authors approve edits

6. Credit & Compensation

- Ownership: Content remains with the author

- Disclaimer: Opinions are those of the author

- Compensation: Case-by-case; indicate desire early

7. Topics of interest

- Arctic security, geostrategic value, resource potential, economic development, federal plans, global competition, preparedness, environmental threats

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Alignment with CIAS Vision and Mission

Media submitted to the CIAS for publication is expected to align with the vision and mission of the CIAS, and to further the mandate of the CIAS:

Vision: People, communities and governments in the Canadian Arctic and North have a strong, region-focused understanding of security threats and opportunities so the Canadian Arctic and North is better prepared to respond.

Mission: We provide clear, relevant and timely information to help people understand Arctic security in the Canadian Arctic and North.

The CIAS takes a very broad view of Arctic security:

Arctic security means keeping the Canadian Arctic and North safe and stable. It includes protecting the land, people and systems that support daily life.

The CIAS may update its vision and mission and set strategic and thematic priorities from time to time.

Healthy and respectful discourse is encouraged. To give a full and fair view of the issues CIAS focuses on, we welcome both common views as well as different or less traditional ideas.

For more, visit the CIAS website at www.arcticsecurityinstitute.ca.

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Contributors

The CIAS is open to amplifying different points of view and diverse backgrounds, particularly those operating or living in the Canadian North.

Academics or professionals are welcome to provide commentary in their area of expertise.

The CIAS recognizes that not all content experts and thought leaders in the Canadian North have western-based credentials. Submission is open to these individuals and the CIAS welcomes those voices.

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Types of content

CIAS wishes to engage its audience using several media formats and methods.

Written articles

- Short format articles, such as op-eds, ranging from 500 to 1,500 words, and infographics can be published on the CIAS digital platform and channels.

- Longer format articles over 2,000 words can be published on the CIAS digital platform and channels.

- In some cases, CIAS will also work to arrange publication in local and national media.

Video recordings

- Video recordings of interviews, speeches and sessions from CIAS events can be published on the CIAS digital platform and channels.

- Purpose built narrative videos can also be submitted.

Audio recordings and podcasts

- Recordings of interviews, speeches and sessions from CIAS events can be published on the CIAS digital platform and channels in audio-only format.

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Submission Process

You can submit content at any time. Connect with CIAS before submitting to ensure your work meets our guidelines. Contact and submission: cias@yukon.ca

Content may be the author’s original work or can be previously published if there are no restrictions from another publisher.

For video or audio submissions, contact the CIAS for guidance on format and delivery of large files.

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Review

Contributors are expected to provide opinions and information that are well-informed and well-researched.

CIAS conducts an anonymous peer review of all content before approving articles and media for publication.

Authors and contributors are encouraged to include a headshot and brief biography. This helps inform reviewers and may be published alongside the content.

Written content

Articles that cite other work must include references. References can be made in the style the author is comfortable with.

Submit written content in a digital word processor format(e.g., .docx).

Accompanying photos or graphics that are of appropriate resolution may accompany articles. The author must confirm that any supplementary media, such as photographs or articles, has been approved for use.

The CIAS may edit submissions for clarity and length.

The CIAS may add disclaimers and contextual notes to articles. These edits will require approval by the author or contributor.

Video or audio content

The CIAS may add graphics, logos, disclaimers and contextual remarks to the start and end of a video or audio submission. Edits will require approval by the author or contributor.

Video content will be reviewed for technical compliance as required.

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Decisions

The decision to post and promote media on the CIAS channels lies solely with the CIAS.

CIAS determines when content is posted however, welcomes input if specific timing supports the author’s other work.

Contributor will be notified of the posting date before the item is put online.

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Credit & Compensation

The content of the article or media is the property of the author or contributor.

A disclaimer will accompany every article or media item stating that the opinions expressed are those of the author or contributor, and do not necessarily represent the views of the CIAS:

The views shared by the Canadian Institute for Arctic Security’s publications are those of individual authors and contributors, not those of the CIAS, our funders, or any government.

On a case-by-case basis, monetary compensation for articles and media that have been solicited by the CIAS will be considered, based on the CIAS determination.

Authors or contributors who seek compensation must indicate their desire early in the submission process. By default, submissions are not compensated unless compensation is discussed and confirmed early in the process.

CIAS determines the value of compensation, and that decision is definitive.

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Topics of Interest

The CIAS takes a broad definition of Arctic security and defines the Arctic and Canadian North. Ideas for content that fall within these broad definitions are welcome.

At this time, the CIAS is interested in:

·        History and current state of Arctic security from indigenous, national, or territorial perspectives.

·        Geostrategic value of the Canadian Arctic.

·        Resource potential of the Canadian Arctic and developing supply chains.

·        Developing the private sector in the North for economic development, presence, and healthy communities.

·        Analysis of current federal plans on Arctic security and defence or exploring platform proposals of federal parties.

·        American foreign policy and the repercussions of that on Arctic relations and security.

·        Global competition in the Arctic and potential threats to Canada.

·        Current preparedness for operating in the Arctic(Joint Task Force North, Canadian Rangers, search and rescue, etc.).

·        Importance of naval vessels, including submarines, and shoreside infrastructure.

·        Review of armed forces activities in the North (Operation NANOOK, etc.) and community involvement in planning and execution.

·        Threats to confidence in democratic institutions.

·        Impacts of drug trade on remote communities.

·        Environmental and climate change threats that impact the security of the North.

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Relations between Canada and the United States are, to put it mildly, strained. But despite all the angry rhetoric, neither country will be able to ignore the perennial truth that our geography matters to the defence of both nations.

Most North Americans perceive our place on the planet through historical projections that place North America in the centre, Europe on the right, and Asia on the left. These maps give the impression that Canada is isolated, with the United States and the three oceans as our only neighbours.

Historically, Russia (or the Soviet Union in the previous century) has been the most significant threat to the defence of the United States and Canada. Given our Mercator projection informed imaginations, it might seem that the way to the United States from Russia involves an eastward or a westward “attack” over either the Pacific or Atlantic Oceans. This view places Canada largely out of the fray of any great power competition.

However, a polar projection, looking down on the earth from a point above the North Pole, changes our perception of the relationship between Canada, the United States, and Russia: if we get ‘above the globe,’ Canada is effectively in the middle.

By far the shortest routes from Russia to the contiguous United States – also called the “Lower 48” – are over Canada. These are the routes that were of most importance at the start of the Cold War and were the reason that the United States and Canada formed the North American Air Defense Command in 1958, later named the North American Aerospace Defense Command(NORAD). The Canadian and U.S. governments established the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, a significant defensive radar line from Alaska, along the Arctic periphery of Canada and across Greenland, as well as a pair of successive East-West radar lines across the ‘middle’ of Canada. These radars were the eyes and ears of NORAD for almost 40 years, allowing NORAD to deter Soviet and Russian bombers from threatening the continent. Canada and the United States set up these defences across the North because that was the best way to protect critical infrastructure located to the south.

Things have changed a lot since the 1950s. First, ballistic missiles replaced bombers as the dominant threat. Then the bombers were armed with cruise missiles instead of gravity bombs. Today’s threats include advanced and hypersonic missiles launched from the air, ships, submarines, or ground launchers. These new cruise missiles travel through the air – more like airplanes than rockets or ballistic missiles – but with advanced navigation, greater range, electronic warfare and stealth-like capabilities and in the case of the hypersonics, much higher speed. At the same time, of course, there are real threats posed by disinformation and other types of hybrid warfare.

But while the threats have changed, the geography remains the same.

And for the record, as Chinese military capability grows and presents a threat, the same geography applies; Canada is in between the United States and their adversaries – China or Russia.

Canada’s position on the northern flank of the United States, and on the shortest direct path to the U.S. from either Russia or China, matters to the defence and security of America today, but in new, modern ways.

For America’s main adversaries, using cruise missiles of whatever generation or capability launched from bomber aircraft, the shortest, quickest, most dangerous avenue of approach and attack will forever be over Canada. While the technologies of the day have evolved, it will always be necessary to “block this route” or deter Russia and China from such an attack. Just because there are now other means to launch an assault, it would be a significant mistake to assume that “they won’t attack that way.” For these “over-the-pole attacks,” new technology can provide better ways to “close off” the northern flank from the modern threats, and Canada needs to follow through on its NORAD Modernization efforts to do so. NORAD Modernization allows Canada, based on its critical geography, to better protect the United States (and itself) from increasingly sophisticated capabilities.

In a more general sense, in today’s complex threat environment, Canada’s position on the northern flank of the United States elevates Canada’s connections relative to America’s defence and security. While United States President Donald Trump’s Iron Dome (or Golden Dome) initiative is aimed at ensuring the U.S. homeland is protected from attacks, a safe and secure America extends as well to threats along the U.S. northern border. As Canada defends itself from attack it also secures the United States’ northern border. Looked at a different way, based on geography, the United States leverages Canada to secure its northern border, the northern flank of America’s defences.

Whether it is air defences or other threats, many countries of the world do not share a border with a friendly or cooperating neighbour, so it may seem that Canada and the United States have alternatives for their self-defences. On one hand, this is true: while it would be less effective and cost more, Canada and the United States could independently assume the defences of their territories and their nations. However, those other neighbouring countries are not placed directly between two nuclear armed, superpower adversaries. Canadians may wish that it was otherwise, but the truth is that Canada occupies prime real estate of considerable interest to the United States in matters of defence.

Canada’s geography brings with it some special responsibilities, as well as opportunities. First and foremost, Americans will be most interested in ensuring Canada contributes to the defence and security of the United States. Given the unchangeable geography, it will always be better if Canada and the United States cooperate on their defences.

Looking down on the Earth makes it apparent that the defences of Canada and the United States are intertwined. This vantage point gives a clear view to the historic and enduring factors that make co-operation on defence in each nation’s best interest. For decades, Canadians and Americans have worked shoulder to shoulder under NORAD to meet these requirements for defence of our countries, but as the world changes the defences need to adapt. What doesn’t change are the geographic realities that make us neighbours and partners.

Canadian and American administrations may struggle to find common ground on trade or any number of issues affecting their citizens’ shared lives on the continent, but in matters of defence and security we will always be bound by our geography. In considering our long-term relationship, Canadians and Americans need to understand that their defence and their security are mutually dependent and interconnected.

Lt.-Gen. (Ret’d) Christopher Coates is Director of National Defence and Foreign Policy at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

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In the current, intense debate about Canadian sovereignty and national defence, the Yukon once again finds itself at the forefront of the conversation. With US President Donald Trump making a series of intemperate and uncalled for threats to Canada’s national sovereignty, the country is tasked to take unprecedented steps to protects its territorial integrity. Canada is also paying the price for decades of neglect of its northern flank.

The nation has been down this path before. In 1870, Canada purchased the vast and unceded lands of Rupertsland from the Hudson’s Bay Company, a transaction facilitated by a British government that was eager to rid itself of its administrative responsibilities for the northern half of British North America. For a quarter of a century, the new country did virtually nothing to assume its obligations for this new territory.  Only in 1894, and then at the urging of Bishop William Carpenter Bompas of the Church Missionary Society, did the Canadian government send a small group from the North West Mounted Police to determine the need to enforce Canadian law in the Fortymile region of the Yukon.  

The timing of this investigative expedition, and the subsequent decision to place a regular establishment in the borderlands mining camp, proved extremely fortuitous. Canada had a police force, albeit small, in the region when gold was discovered in the Klondike in 1896. They brought legal formality and structure to a potentially chaotic frontier mining camp, establishing respect for law and order before the massive influx in the 1897-1898 stampede.

As the prospectors and camp followers flooded into the region and as the Yukon River basin quickly became one of the richest and most famous places on earth, Canada’s concerns escalated. Most of the stampeders came from the United States. They brought with them the aggressive attitudes of the American resource frontier, moderated by their collective vulnerability to the extreme cold and isolation of the Canadian Northwest. The NWMP proved effective in enforcing Canadian laws and mining regulations but the cultural assertiveness of the mining community, the size of the American population, and the increasing US interest in the Klondike worried Canada authorities.

Canada was ill-placed to respond to this unanticipated threat to Canadian sovereignty. The country had no standing army but there was a small militia. The Government of Canada resolved to send 200 soldiers, named the Yukon Field Force, to establish a base at Fort Selkirk and to re-enforce Canadian authority in the region. The heavily equipped unit made the lengthy journey to the Yukon, travelling along the Stikine River to avoid having to go to the Yukon through the United States.

The American threat proved more illusory than real. The gold rush slowed by 1899 and the need for the Field Force quickly declined. The militia was moved out, in stages, between 1899 and 1900, with some of the militiamen deployed to support the British war with the Boers in South Africa. It is not that the US had lost interest in the region. The Americans discovered that they got most of what they wanted out of the Klondike – particularly gold and business opportunities – without annexing or occupying the gold fields.  

The Canadian Northwest found itself again on the front lines of continent defence during World War II, particularly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The construction of the Northwest Staging Route through the Yukon started before 1941 and proved to be only the start of the wartime occupation of the Northwest. The Staging Route was followed in 1942 by the construction of the hastily planned Alaska Highway. The parallel development CANOL pipeline and Whitehorse oil refinery placed the Yukon in the centre of military preparations in the region. 

The burst of activity faded quickly, for the American victory at the battle of Midway in June 1942 eliminated much of the Japanese threat and resulted in the quick roll-back of American military and construction activity in the Yukon. The Northwest was left with a highway that was poorly located and far from complete. The pipeline and refinery closed soon after the end of the war. 

These events – the Gold Rush and the defence of Alaska and the Northwest during World War II – demonstrated the vulnerability of Canada’s Northern flank and the costs of inadequate national preparations for the protection of the area. But the lessons were poorly learned. After World War II, Canada relied on American military protection throughout the Cold War and slowly dismantled the country’s northern military strength. By the 1970s, the Canadian military establishment in the area had all but disappeared, with the country sheltered by the NORAD defence systems and with little on-the-ground presence.

Canada finds itself, at the end of the first quarter of the 21^st century, once again ill-prepared for the geopolitical challenges of our age. And the Yukon, much as in the late 19^th century, finds itself once more on the front lines of the effort to assert and protect Canadian sovereignty. Perhaps the next few years will see the establishment of a contemporary version of the Yukon Field Force – a regular, substantial North-based military establishment that goes beyond showing the flag and demonstrates Canada’s determination to defend the Far North. Maybe, just maybe, Canada will finally learn one of the North’s most important lessons: that neglecting the region leaves it vulnerable to external dangers and stops Canada from the vital work of completing Confederation in the territorial North.