Commentary

October 2025 Newsletter

Read it here.

Minister Ranj Pillai summarizes his years as an advocate for Arctic security during his time in Yukon government.

"For this Institute... continue to be a conduit to provide that support and understanding so that when organizations are coming from southern Canada to do this incredibly important work, that they have the right supports and the right knowledge."

Watch the whole interview on our Facebook page (19mins):

https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1WnneaSTgV/

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The Arctic is central to Canada’s national identity and the Canadian Arctic is pivotal to several key defence and infrastructures policies. While polling periodically capture the pulse of Canadians from Southern Canada, very little is known about how Arctic residents think about key Arctic debates and issues. In many cases, we cling to anecdotes and sweeping generalizations (“Northerners support policy X”) without hard evidence. This reports ambition is to go further than anecdotal evidence and simplistic assumptions of the Canadian Arctic by analyzing data from an opinion poll conducted with respondents from the three Canadian Northern territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut).

The survey was carried out from May 8 to 26 2025 amongst a random sample of 609 Canadians aged 18 and over living in the three Northern territories. Answers were collected through a hybrid online/phone method. Questions focused on respondents’ opinions about the Arctic strategic and geopolitical context as well as their preferences on specific Arctic policies.

See the full report on the Observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l’Arctique (OSPA) website here:

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/6554d9d0675b18544979e93f/t/68c044ad0d691e709427b077/1757430957107/Report+-+First+annual+Canadian+Arctic+Survey.pdf

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About the authors:

Mathieu Landriault is the director of the Observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l’Arctique. He is an adjunct professor at École nationale d’administration publique (ÉNAP) and teaches at the University of Ottawa and Saint Paul University.  

Mirva Salminen is Associate Professor in the Department of Technology and Safety at UiT – The Arctic University of Norway.

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Watch the interview on Facebook:

https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1AyWbvK83E/

Project Lead Andrew Smith checks in with CBC Yukon to discuss the progress of the CIAS, some of the big ideas in Arctic security, and the LATITUDE conference that took place on August 26.

Listen here

https://www.cbc.ca/listen/live-radio/1-206-midday-cafe/clip/16166319-yukon-wooing-defence-industry-talk-arctic-security-ramps

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In June 2025, CIAS Project-Lead Andrew Smith drove the Dempster Highway to Inuvik to attend the Arctic Development Expo, continuing his drive all the way to Tuktoyaktuk and Canada's Arctic coast. This short video documents the journey, highlighting the vast Arctic landscapes and the critical infrastructure that links the South of Canada to the Arctic coast, displaying a prime example of how to secure Canada's northwest.

Watch the video on CIAS's Facebook here:

https://fb.watch/BqbtggKINl/

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Addressing civilian infrastructure gaps is not a primary DND/CAF responsibility. Nevertheless, the historic role of the Royal Canadian Engineers in bridge building to help complete the Dempster Highway and in improving Arctic airfields (in parts of the NWT that now are part of Nunavut) also signals the potential for creative CAF training opportunities that contribute directly to addressing local infrastructure gaps in the territories.¹

The CAF’s public description of Operation NANOOK places particular emphasis on its relationships with the “Indigenous communities” that form “the heart of Canada’s North,” a region which it works to strengthen “through collaborative and continuous discourse throughout the year.”² Accordingly, Canada’s defence policy and the ANPF highlight the importance of relationship building and engagement between the CAF and northern Indigenous Peoples as the military leverages new capabilities to “support broader Government of Canada priorities.”³ Over the last decade, the CAF has strengthened community engagement during routine operations, exercises, and annual deployments to and in the North. Most importantly, its ongoing relationships with communities through the Canadian Rangers and the Junior Canadian Ranger program provide vital connections with local stakeholders and rightsholders.⁴ In committing the Defence team to enhance its Arctic capabilities, Strong, Secure, Engaged explains that the CAF will continue to “work to expand and deepen our extensive relationships with these communities.” This also invites new ways to “work with territorial governments and Indigenous communities to ensure [that] the North achieves its full potential both in terms of resource development and community capacity building.”⁵

To strengthen its “continuous and collaborative discourse” with Northerners and support the federal government’s ANPF objectives, the CAF might look for new models and approaches in the remote northern regions of two close allies: the United States and Australia. The Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) exercises carried out by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in Alaska and the long-standing Australian Army Aboriginal Community Assistance Program (AACAP) offer examples of how the CAF might consider broadening its engagement with remote northern Indigenous communities. These relatively small but mutually-beneficial deployments directly contribute to community health, well-being, and resilience, while providing training experiences to a wide cross-section of military personnel.

The US DoD’s IRT initiatives aim to “produce mission-ready forces through military training opportunities that provide key services to underserved communities throughout the U.S.”⁶ Specific objectives include the provision of “hands-on, real-world training to improve readiness and survivability in contingency environments,” the cultivation of civil-military partnerships with a “culturally complex population,” and the development of innovative resource management by leveraging “military contributions and community resources to multiply value and cost savings for participants.”⁷ Projects begin with applications from federal, state, local, or tribal governments, non-profit entities, or community organizations asking for military assistance for projects and laying out what local support, funding, resources, and partners they can contribute. Applications must also certify that the military’s assistance is not “reasonably available” from a commercial entity or that the private sector “has agreed to the provision of such services by the Armed Forces.”⁸ Under the guidance of the Director, Civil-Military Training Policy, in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Integration, military services then choose projects based on current training needs and value.⁹ The military assistance provided under the IRT program generally includes health care delivery, infrastructure support (including runways, roads, bridges, buildings, marine installations), cybersecurity, youth training programs, and veterinary services.

IRT missions in Alaska provide soldiers with key training opportunities and experience in civil-military relations, joint service interoperability, engineering and construction skill-building, health care delivery, logistics, and transport. Personnel receive extensive, “real-world” training on the equipment they will use and practices that they will employ when deployed on operations abroad.¹⁰ Reports on Alaskan IRT missions often highlight their role in boosting morale and encouraging personnel retention. These projects also provide the chance to work with international partners, including CAF members and other Canadian health professionals.¹¹ In short, these experiences improve deployment readiness: the ultimate objective of the IRT program.

In executing IRT projects for communities that lack the resources to carry them out on their own, military units are given the chance to practice essential skills, including the organization and execution of complex engineering and construction tasks, the establishment of effective health services in new and challenging environments, and the provision of logistical, transportation, and communications support.¹² The majority of these projects also involve a high degree of joint service cooperation, allowing units to practice their interoperability in a wide variety of settings, often for extended periods.¹³ IRT initiatives usually demand a high degree of interagency, intergovernmental, and community coordination, and occasionally include multi-national partners, providing service members with experience “integrat[ing] as a joint and whole-of-society team to serve American citizens.”¹⁴ DoD highlights that these projects are designed to increase deployment readiness and foster civil-military relations, while “enhancing morale and contributing to military recruitment and retention.”¹⁵ During times when budget constraints cut into military training opportunities, IRT is a “win-win” practice that provides the military with skill-building and communities with essential services.¹⁶

Public policy scholar Peter Kikkert also suggests that the Army Aboriginal Community Assistance Programme (AACAP) in Australia might serve as a model to inspire the CAF to “leverage its capabilities to address the priority on infrastructure gaps while strengthening its relationships with Indigenous communities and fulfilling essential training and operational-readiness objectives.” In Australia, this military program helps to build critical infrastructure such as airfields, roads, and barge landings in communities. In so doing, the Australian Defence Force not only supports the construction of infrastructure and training, it also “builds cultural awareness and teaches community engagement and relationship-building skills that have proven useful on overseas deployments.”¹⁷

The Australian program has direct military training benefits, as well as community ones. A 2017 evaluation observed that, “through AACAP, the Australian Army aims to train and test selected capabilities against the themes of ‘population support’ and ‘Indigenous capacity building.’”¹⁸ The focus on community engagement and capacity building supports the Army’s Indigenous Strategy, which commits to a whole of government approach to building relationships and “contribute to the development of Indigenous communities.”¹⁹ Likewise, the program has become a key pillar of the Australian Defence Force’s Defence Reconciliation Action Plan, which calls for “building respectful relations with Indigenous people, communities and organisations” and “the development of a consistent Defence approach to building relationships” with these communities.²⁰ AACAP also represents a military contribution to the Australian government’s Closing the Gap initiative aimed at improving Indigenous life expectancy and overall health, education, and employment outcomes.²¹ Contingent commander Major Henry Stimson highlighted this latter role when he explained that “from Army’s perspective AACAP is a mechanism for our own training benefit, but also it’s a great vehicle for us to support the nation by assisting in the ongoing development in these remote communities.”²²

Although the CAF face significant personnel and resource constraints that limit its ability to take on new initiatives, the Alaskan IRT and Australian AACAP projects could inspire thinking about how Northern Canadian leaders might invite the Canadian military to deliver on pledges to enhance its ability to project and sustain forces in the Arctic, deepen partnerships, and improve readiness through activities that leave enduring, positive legacies for Northern communities. The operations conducted by our allies resonate with priorities articulated in the ANPF, particularly on closing infrastructure gaps and creating conditions so that “Canadian Arctic and northern Indigenous peoples are resilient and healthy.”²³ The adoption of a training component could also contribute to capacity building and skill development. By expanding and deepening relationships to identify and prioritize projects, a deliberate DND/CAF initiative along these lines could generate new opportunities to support Northern communities and create exciting training opportunities.

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Dr. Peter Kikkert is an Associate Professor in the Public Policy and Governance program at St. Francis Xavier University. His current research program focuses on how to strengthen search and rescue, disaster and emergency management capabilities, and community disaster resilience in rural, remote, and Northern communities. He is the academic lead for the Kitikmeot SAR Project, the Nunavut SAR Project, and the Nunavik Roundtable on SAR, and is a member of the Maximum Expected Time to Rescue research team. He has had the privilege to learn from and work with community responders and Elders on the land, ice, and waters of the Canadian North and Alaska.

Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He was Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories from 2014-2020 and was reappointed to this position from 2022-2025. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Brian Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University and the Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience, School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Indigenous-state relations. Whitney has (co-) written or (co-) edited more than sixty books and more than one hundred academic articles and chapters.

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1 - This section is drawn from Peter Kikkert and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Civil-Military Operational Support to the ‘Heart of Canada’s North’: Looking to Alaska and the Australian North for Options?” Canadian Military Journal 21, no.4 (Autumn 2021): 26-39, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2021/mdn-dnd/D12-8-21-4-eng.pdf, which contains more detail and specific case studies.

2 - DND, “Operation Nanook,” https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-nanook.html.

3 - DND, Strong, Secure, Engaged, 80; CIRNAC, “ANPF: Safety, Security, and Defence Chapter” (2019), https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1562939617400/1562939658000.

4 - DND, Strong, Secure, Engaged, 80.

5 - Chief of the Defence Staff, Initiating Directive for the Development of the CAF Arctic Campaign Plan, 21 August 2018, 3.

6 - Sgt. Melissa Martens, “Arctic Care 2018 Readiness Training Begins in Northwestern Alaska,” Department of Defense (DoD) News, 16 April 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1494560/arctic-care-2018-readiness-training-event-begins-in-northwestern-alaska/.

7 - DoD, “Innovative Readiness Training: About,” https://irt.defense.gov/About/.

8 - IRT, “Community Application How-To Guide,” DoD, 27 November 2018, https://public.huddle.com/b/dvMpMn/index.html.

9 - DoD, “Innovative Readiness Training Brochure 2019,” https://irt.defense.gov/Portals/57/Documents/IRT_Brochure-20190603%20.pdf?ver=2019-12-17-140228-270.

10 - Brian Fraley, “Arctic Care 2017 Completed,” Kodiak Area Native Association, http://kodiakhealthcare.org/kana-news/arctic-care-2017-completed/.

11 - Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, “Arctic Care 2017,” https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/ArcticCare2017.

12 - IRT, “Innovative Readiness Training: Military Value,” DoD (2020), https://irt.defense.gov/Portals/57/Documents/Senior_DoD_Official_Value_Prop-2020.pdf.

13 - National Guard, “Innovative Readiness Training Fact Sheet,” https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Resources/Fact%20Sheets/Innovative%20Readiness%20Training%20Fact%20Sheet%20(Dec.%202017).pdf.

14 - DoD, “IRT: About.”

15 - Lt. Cmdr.  Elizabeth Zimmermann, “Training for Diversity,” The Naval Reservist 35, no. 9 (October 2009): 6, https://www.public.navy.mil/nrh/Publications/2009/TNROCT09.pdf.

16 - Tony Perry, “Marines Take Long, Hard Road in Alaska,” Los Angeles Times, 10 August 1998, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-aug-10-mn-11879-story.html.

17 - Peter Kikkert, “How creating an Armed Forces Indigenous community assistance program would pay off,” Policy Options, 31 March 2021, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/march-2021/how-creating-an-armed-forces-indigenous-community-assistance-program-would-pay-off/.

18 - DPM&C and Australian Army, AACAP 2017 Review.

19 - Australian Army, “Army Indigenous Supplement to the Defence Indigenous Handbook,” https://www.defence.gov.au/publications/docs/ArmyIndigenousSupplement.pdf

20 - DoD(Aust.), “Reconciliation Action Plan, 2015-2018,” Government of Australia, www.defence.gov.au/Diversity/_Master/docs/drap/DRAP.pdf.

21 - Serge DeSilva-Ranasinghe, “Indigenous Nation Building: The Army Aboriginal Community Assistance Programme,” Policy 30/4 (2014-15): 29-35.

22 - Serge DeSilva-Ranasinghe, “Up North with the Army: National Building with Indigenous Communities,” Policy 31/1 (2015): 51-54.

23 - Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, “Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework,” https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1560523306861/1560523330587

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For too long, conversations about Arctic defence and security have happened without the full and equal participation of those who live in the North. Decisions have been made far from our communities, often without meaningful engagement – or at all. The result has been policies that overlook both the lived realities and the strengths of Yukon First Nations.

The release of Yukon First Nations Defence and Security: Prioritizing Sovereignty, Preparedness, and Partnership marks a significant shift. It is not simply a set of recommendations; it is a roadmap for how Canada can strengthen its northern security by working with, rather than around, Yukon First Nations.

The report reflects over three years of collaboration between the Assembly of First Nations Yukon Region and the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network. It builds on virtual open houses and the inaugural Yukon First Nations Defence and Security Industries Conference, which brought together leaders, experts, and practitioners to discuss climate resilience, emergency preparedness, critical infrastructure, and economic security.

What makes this work different, is the approach. Instead of consultation after decisions have been made, it is co-creation from the start. Yukon First Nations are already leading in emergency management, infrastructure development, and economic innovation. The report calls on all partners to recognize, support, and resource that leadership.

The findings are rooted in the lived experiences of Yukon First Nations. From maintaining year-round transportation infrastructure in the face of permafrost thaw to managing the increasing risks of wildfire, flooding, and extreme weather, life in the North demands tailored, locally driven solutions. Participants stressed the need for sustained investment in dual-use infrastructure that meets both community needs and national defence priorities, including airports, telecommunications systems, and transportation routes critical for security operations, health care, food security, and economic development.

The report also emphasizes the value of the Canadian Rangers as community-based security assets. Strengthening these programs with better training, equipment, and support will improve Arctic defence and empower northern communities to lead their safety and preparedness. In the North, climate change is a security challenge that affects every aspect of life. Thawing permafrost threatens infrastructure, unpredictable ice conditions affect hunting and travel, and frequent extreme weather events strain emergency response systems.

The report calls for a whole-of-society approach to climate resilience, where federal, territorial, and Indigenous governments work together to anticipate and address emerging risks. That means not only responding to disasters but investing in prevention and adaptation. Yukon First Nations hold traditional knowledge and place-based expertise that can shape more effective and sustainable strategies.

Security in the North is also about economic resilience. Yukon First Nations are clear that partnerships with the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces must include opportunities for First Nation businesses and development corporations. This could mean procurement contracts, participation in infrastructure projects, and involvement in training and operational exercises. Economic partnerships build local capacity, create jobs, and ensure that investments in Arctic security strengthen the social and economic fabric of our communities. It is part of embedding sovereignty and self-determination into defence planning.

The overarching message is simple: if Canada wants to protect the North, it must partner with those who have been protecting it for generations. That requires moving beyond symbolic gestures to concrete, sustained collaboration. First Nations must be engaged from the outset of planning processes. Decision-making must be transparent and inclusive. Resources must go where they will have the most significant impact, and success must be measured not only in strategic outcomes but in community well-being.

The path forward is one of shared leadership. When federal and territorial governments, the Canadian Armed Forces, and Yukon First Nations work side by side, we are stronger in defending the Arctic and in building a future where communities are safer, more resilient, and more self-reliant. The report is an invitation to change the way we think about security in the North. The work ahead will require trust, respect, and a willingness to listen and adapt. It will require recognizing that Yukon First Nations are partners with knowledge, capacity, and a vested interest in protecting our lands and people.

Canada’s ability to respond to Arctic security challenges will depend on how well we embrace this shift. The threats we face are complex and evolving. The solutions must be equally dynamic and grounded in the realities of those who call the North home. As we move forward, we must commit to co-creation, not consultation after the fact. We must ensure that investments in defence also strengthen our communities, and we must build a model of partnership in the Yukon that can inspire and guide northern security efforts across the country.

The North is changing. The question is whether our approach to security will change with it. The report offers a path forward. It is up to all of us to take it.

As Regional Chief, I have heard the call from our leaders, our Elders, and our people. We are ready to lead, and we are asking Canada to walk beside us. The future of the North cannot be decided in boardrooms far away. It must be built here, together, in partnership and good faith. Our sovereignty is not negotiable. Our knowledge is not optional. Our participation is not a courtesy. If we want a secure and prosperous Arctic, the time to act is now, and the way forward is clear.

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Read Yukon First Nations Defence and Security: Prioritizing Sovereignty, Preparedness, and Partnerships here: https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/2025-YFN-Defence-Security-Final-Report.pdf

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Regional Chief Kluane Adamek, Aagé, (she/her)  is a proud northerner, citizen of Kluane First Nation, and mother to her daughter, Tayāna Copper-Jane. She honours and acknowledges the Matriarchs who have welcomed her into the Dakl’aweidi (Killer whale) Clan. Her Grandmother, the late Agnes Johnson, Ch’aalį umą̀, always reminded her that her post-secondary education, lived experiences and ancestry, have given her the ability to analyze the world around her from several different perspectives. Kluane is a First Nation woman with mixed ancestry. Having lived in both northern and southern parts of the country, her experiences have given her the ability to analyze the world around her from several converging perspectives. In 2020 she received a ‘ Top 25 Canadian Women of Influence’ award in recognition of her contributions and achievements. She has always been passionate about supporting the next generation and led the founding of ‘Our Voices’ – Northern Indigenous Emerging Leaders Collective. Kluane continues to press for change in the ways that women, young people, and the next generation are included in decision-making forums, and she is committed to advancing solutions while approaching leadership from a true place of values.

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In early June, Prime Minister Carney met with the nation’s Premiers and discussed “needed investments in dual-use infrastructure in Northern and Arctic communities that will address Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and security goals, meet local community needs, advance national energy independence, and unlock the North’s economic potential.”¹  

The idea of dual-use infrastructure in Canada’s Arctic and North is clearly top of mind for many decision makers, and following this trend, the Arctic Security Working Group (ASWG) met in Whitehorse on the 28th and 29th of May to discuss this topic. ASWG is co-chaired by the Commander Joint Task Force North (JTFN) and a rotation of the three territorial governments. The purpose of ASWG is to “enhance the safety and security of Canada’s North through information-sharing and cooperation among federal and territorial government department and agencies,” as well as facilitating planning with other partners such as Indigenous governments, academia, and the private sector.²  

Dual-use infrastructure was discussed extensively over the course of the two days, with some central themes emerging. First, there is a need to better define what constitutes dual-use infrastructure. Second, dual-use infrastructure should be used to achieve both national security and community resilience in the North and Arctic. Third, dual-use infrastructure can be cost-effective and scalable if it upgrades and retrofits existing infrastructure. From these three themes, one can extract three interrelated questions that can help to demystify the concept of dual-use infrastructure in Canada’s North and Arctic: What is dual-use infrastructure? What purpose does dual-use infrastructure serve? Why is dual-use infrastructure important?

What is dual-use infrastructure?

To date, Canada has not created a strict definition of "dual-use infrastructure," or an objective list of criteria to evaluate a project. Some may allude to the idea that dual-use infrastructure is infrastructure used for military activities on the weekdays and civilian activities on the weekends. Take for instance the Mary Lake Cadet Barracks outside Whitehorse, where in 2014 I stayed overnight for my grade 8 band camp and in 2021 was used to house Canadian Armed Forces members during their response to the Southern Lakes flooding. The gulf between these types of use underscores the need for actors in the Arctic security landscape to demystify and deromanticize the notion of dual-use infrastructure in the North.

Dual-use infrastructure should be thought of as conventional infrastructure that benefits everyday civilian and commercial needs while also contributing to strategic military considerations.³ Examples include upgraded all season roads, highways, bridges, airports, and aerodromes; energy transmission lines with increased redundancies; and more connected broadband and telecommunication networks; among other things.⁴

Of course, these are all examples of infrastructure that civilian Northerners would greatly benefit from. These are also examples of infrastructure that are essential for a sustainable military presence in the North that can be integrated into a nationwide Arctic security and defence strategy.³ Dual-use infrastructure should not only be thought of as a physical building used by both military and civilians, rather, it should be thought of as the everyday infrastructure Northerners rely on that can simultaneously contribute to effective military operations.

What purpose does dual-use infrastructure serve?

Another area that requires demystification is the purpose of dual-use infrastructure. Media coverage surrounding Canada’s Arctic sovereignty has been increasingly studied, with many researchers concluding that the media’s reactions to Arctic security are oftentimes “alarmist”⁵ and exposing Canadians to “myths about our Arctic sovereignty being much more precarious than it is.”⁶ In that sense, it is important to clarify the role that an increased military presence and dual-use infrastructure in the North would play.  

The vast majority of Arctic security scholars agree that despite rising geopolitical tensions around the world, the risk of an armed conflict in the Arctic is low. As a result, military investments in the North and Arctic are not so much intended for power projection as they are for increased domain awareness.³ The investments into the dual-use infrastructure described above should not be interpreted as the Canadian military gearing up for an impending armed conflict in the North and Arctic. Instead, investments in dual-use infrastructure should be viewed as a means to enhance the military’s ability to monitor the land, maritime, air and space, and cyber domains; engage in search-and-rescue operations; and respond to natural or human-made disasters (like the 2021 Southern Lakes flooding or the 2023 evacuation of Yellowknife due to wildfires).⁷  

While the above examples should be the primary purpose of dual-use infrastructure in the North, in the unlikely event of a major global conflagration in the Arctic or an unexpected event like the 2023 Yukon balloon incident, dual-use infrastructure will also be helpful to better coordinate and execute Canadian or allied military operations in the North.

Why is dual-use infrastructure important?

There is a general consensus that the well-being of Northern communities and Indigenous people is a fundamental prerequisite for Canada’s Arctic security.⁸ So while dual-use infrastructure contributes to strategic military objectives, it can also improve communication and accessibility in Northern communities and Indigenous communities. In turn, this can help alleviate pressures on “soft infrastructure” such as health care, housing, education, emergency services, and employment.  

For instance, improved telecommunications infrastructure and highways can facilitate the expansion of telehealth and enable greater integration of health and education service delivery between communities. Improved highways and airports can lower the cost of transportation, which can lower the cost of materials, construction, labour, and eventually, the cost of housing. Upgrading and building the infrastructure itself can create more employment opportunities while improved communication and accessibility can enable commuting or remote-work opportunities.⁹ Simply put, dual-use infrastructure not only helps military operations but can contribute to the well-being of Northern and Indigenous communities, ultimately strengthening Canada’s overall Arctic security.  

With the Government of Canada and other NATO allies recently announcing their commitment to spending 5% of GDP on national defence by 2035, including 1.5% of GDP (around $45 billion) on “defence and security-related...infrastructure and resilience,”¹⁰ there is certainly a massive opportunity to leverage dual-use infrastructure as a means of simultaneously advancing national security, improving the everyday lives of Northerners, and bolstering Canada’s overall Arctic security.  

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Zach Zimmermann is a Coordinator with the Canadian Institute for Arctic Security, a Research Fellow with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAASDN), and a Master's student doing research on military security in the High North. Born in Inuvik, NWT and raised in Whitehorse, Yukon, Zach is passionate about protecting his home, uplifting Northern youth voices, and eventually becoming an expert in Arctic Security.

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1 - Prime Minister of Canada. “First Ministers' statement on building a strong Canadian economy and advancing major projects.” Prime Minister of Canada / Premier ministre du Canada, 2 June 2025, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/06/02/first-ministers-statement-building-strong-canadian-economy-and-advancing-major-projects.  Accessed 13 June 2025.

2 - Department of National Defence. “Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces 2021-22 Departmental Results Report.” 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/departmental-results-report/2021-22-index.html.  

3 - Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Katharina Koch. “NORTHERN AND ARCTIC SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR A NORTHERN CORRIDOR.” The School of Public Policy Publications, vol. 14, no. 20, 2021, https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/EN_FR_NC25_Arctic-Security_Lackenbauer-Koch.pdf.

4 - Yukon Arctic Security Advisory Council. “Report of the Yukon Arctic Security Advisory Council.” Yukon Government, November 2024, https://yukon.ca/sites/default/files/eco/eco-arctic-security-advisory-council-report_0.pdf.

5 - Gayan, Praneel K. “Arctic Security and Sovereignty through a Media Lens: A Study by Mathieu Landriault.” NAASDN, 16 March 2021, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Gayan-policy-brief_Breaking-Through_Landriault-chapter.pdf  

6 - Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Situating the Yukon in Canadian Arctic Defence and Security.” NAASDN, April 2024, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2024apr-Lackenbauer-Yukon-defence-security.pdf.  

7 - Østhagen, Andreas. 2018. “Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic.” The Routledge Handbook of Polar Regions, M. Nuttall, T. R. Christensen, and M. J. Siegert, eds. Oxon and New York: Routledge p.348

8 - Carleton University. “Securing Canada's Arctic: A Strategic Imperative for Multi-Use, Multi-User Infrastructure.” Carleton University, 5 March 2025, https://carleton.ca/cipser/2025/securing-canadas-arctic/. Accessed 13 June 2025.  

9 - Christensen, Julia. “IMPLICATIONS OF A NORTHERN CORRIDOR ON SOFT INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE NORTH AND NEAR NORTH.” The School of Public Policy Publications, vol. 16, no. 25, 2023, https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/NC38-ImplicNC-on-Soft-InfrastructureNorth.Christensen-1.pdf.  

10 - NATO. “NATO Defence Ministers agree new capability targets to strengthen the Alliance.” NATO, 5 June 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_235900.htm.  

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The Arctic is no longer on the periphery of global affairs. Climate change evokes images of a resource-rich region increasingly accessible to outside actors. Technological advancement is providing competitors and adversaries with new strategic delivery systems which mean that North America is “no longer a sanctuary.” Time and space, including ballistic trajectories, make the Arctic a likely thoroughfare for a kinetic attack on the United States or Canada. In an era of renewed strategic competition, the risk of unintended escalation or the spillover of global conflict into the region cannot be dismissed.

Emerging thought leaders can study the Arctic and North in the abstract in distant classrooms, but our experiences in the region convince us that nothing can replace being there. While we often equate northern challenges with extreme cold weather, the practical realities associated with remoteness, sparse infrastructure, and vast distances are best understood by seeing it with one’s own eyes and learning from the people who live and operate in the region.  

In November 2024, we organized an Alaska/Yukon Field School on Strengthening Canada-US Arctic Defence and Security Cooperation and Policy, bringing twelve cadets from the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) together with nine students from universities across Canada on an 1100-km trip from Anchorage to Whitehorse.¹ Along the way, we visited the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF), received a commander’s brief at Eielson Air Force Base, and interacted with Canadian Rangers in Whitehorse, before holding culminating activities at Yukon University. Students engaged with a diverse array of northern researchers and practitioners with whom they learned about the multifaceted nature of Arctic security, various forms of expertise that contribute to the national defence and security enterprise, and the importance of Whole of Society approaches guided by the spirit of “nothing about us, without us” – assuring that Northern citizens are continuously engaged in planning, preparedness, and decision making.  

Students came to the activity aware that the Arctic has long been a conduit through which Russian strategic weapons could pass on their way to southern Canada and the lower forty-eight states. They also were aware that the threat of kinetic attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasing, and that both countries were fielding or testing advanced weapon systems which Canada and the United States cannot defeat with existing systems. They learned that the threat to the American Arctic had aspects that are distinct from the Canadian threat environment. The implications of these differences are often overlooked or downplayed by security commentators.

Students noted the significant military presence in Alaska compared to the Yukon. Elmendorf and Eielson Air Force Bases are huge, populated by fleets of advanced aircraft and supported by extensive critical military infrastructure. The commander’s brief unpacked for field school participants that this significant air power has two major roles. The first is to deter Russia and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and defend Alaska, if necessary, from a kinetic attack. The second role is to project force into the Pacific region in the event of war given the curvature of the earth and Alaska’s situatedness in the North Pacific - which explains recent suggestions that the Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) wants to reopen a base at Adak on the Aleutian Islands chain.²

At Eielson participants realized that Alaska is in the crosshairs of both the PRC and Russia in a way that Northern Canada is not. Alaska is the western flank of USNORTHCOM, charged primarily with defending the US homeland from attack. In the event of war with either Russia, the PRC, or both, USNORTHCOM can use Alaskan military power to intercept attacking bombers and missiles passing through its aerospace on their way deep into Canada and the US. Northern Canada shares this threat, and Canadian or NORAD military infrastructure like the North Warning System (NWS) is geared towards detecting and tracking threats passing through the Canadian Arctic destined for targets in the south. Geographical distinctions matter. Because Alaska also represents the northern flank of INDOPACOM, in the event of a conflict with the PRC, the US will project power from Alaska into the Pacific theatre. This creates an extremely strong incentive for the PRC to try and check that power projection capability. Technological advancement and increasing PRC military spending is giving it a greater range and depth of options to shoot the proverbial archer in Alaska before it can fire its arrows into the Pacific, as well as to thwart resupply of forward-deployed US forces in the state. This means Alaska must defend against these threats to it.

The Canadian Arctic has no power projection capabilities permanently stationed in it. Accordingly, in the event of war in the Pacific, there is much less incentive for the PRC to launch attacks directly against Canada’s northern territories. What are the implications for Canada’s defence posture?

The kinetic threat that the PRC poses to the Western North American Arctic is different for the US than for Canada. Alaska is a strategic hinge of USNORTHCOM and INDOPACOM, thus making it a geography in which the PRC would seek to disrupt US power projection capabilities into the Indo-Pacific region (the PRC’s own centre of gravity). This places distinct demands on Canada in terms of its contributions to NORAD modernization and how possible future cooperation on a “Golden Dome” missile defence system could work to detect, deter, and defend against threats through and to the North American Arctic. While the US must address probable PRC threats to and through its Western Arctic, Canada should focus on PRC threats through that subregion that would be intended to strike strategic targets further south in Canada or the continental United States.

While US strategic documents gesture towards these distinct dynamics, it was not until our group visited Alaska and spoke with practitioners that we gleaned this insight relative to Canada’s Western Arctic. Students left the Alaska/Yukon Field School with a new appreciation for how NATO’s “western flank” fits into continental and international defence.  

The participants in the field school developed a greater appreciation of how overall levels of development and infrastructure investment shape the Arctic experience for both civilian and military transportation. The vast breadth of Alaska and Canada’s northern territories, sparse populations, and infrastructure underinvestment places limits on transportation routing options. The Yukon Territory maintains approximately 4,800 kilometres of all-season highways that connect every local community, apart from the most northerly community, Old Crow, which is served exclusively by air. Participants learned how climate change will continue to have compounding effects on transportation systems and related infrastructure and exacerbate the need to address existing infrastructure deficiencies. For example, warming and thawing of ice-rich permafrost (which we learned about in a remarkable guided tour of the Permafrost Tunnel Research Facility near Fairbanks, operated by the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory as part of its mission for the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center) has led to ground settlement, slope instability, drainage issues, and road cracking.

The field school demonstrated the importance of providing experiential learning opportunities for emerging thought leaders to discern challenges and policy options in the shared Canada-US Arctic defence space. Having considered geography, cultures, and history in place, we hope that the participants will contemplate and strive to avoid past mistakes when the priorities of local populations and the particularities of place were overlooked or dismissed. Taken together, the opportunities, challenges, increased competition, and risks associated with a more accessible (and unpredictable) Arctic require a greater fidelity in anticipating and preparing to address different threats through, to, and in North American Arctic regions.

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Dr. Ryan Dean is a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN) at the Brian Mulroney Institute of Government at St. Francis Xavier University and a Network Coordinator with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) at Trent University.

Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He was Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories from 2014-2020 and was reappointed to this position from 2022-2025. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Brian Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University and the Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience, School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Indigenous-state relations. Whitney has (co-) written or (co-) edited more than sixty books and more than one hundred academic articles and chapters.

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1 - Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. Strengthening Canada-US Arctic Defence and Security Cooperation and Policy through Youth Experiential Learning. NAADSN, 9 June 2025, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/24nov-Lackenbauer-MINDS-TEG-Report-Alaska-Yukon-Field-School.pdf.

2 - Thompson, John. “U.S. Military Top Brass Look to Reopen Strategic Base on the Aleutians.” Alaska’s News Source, 11 Apr. 2025, https://www.alaskasnewssource.com/2025/04/11/us-military-top-brass-look-reopen-strategic-base-aleutians/.

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