Security and safety threats in the Arctic originate within and have primary implications for the region. The pan-northern territorial leaders’ statement on climate change in Spring 2022 highlighted that increased funding for emergency management must be a key part of climate change response in the North.1 Community first responders across the Canadian North often raise broader emergency-management and community-safety concerns, including the risks posed by fires, prolonged power outages, and other critical infrastructure failures. In particular, first responders flagged the broad spectrum of natural and human-made hazards created or exacerbated by climate change: forest fires; unpredictable ice conditions; permafrost thaw risks; severe weather events; erosion, water level and ice flow risks; flooding; and myriad issues raised by increased outside human activity, including environmental pollution and the prospect of a major marine disaster.2 While DND/CAF and other federal departments have valuable (and sometimes essential) capabilities that can be brought to bear in response to non-military emergencies, it is important to acknowledge that they are often activated through a request for assistance (RFA) when a local or territorial government has primary responsibility for dealing with a particular threat.
The North is already warming at least twice as fast as the global rate, creating changes to the natural environment that affect the health and well-being of the territory’s residents and their traditional livelihoods, as well as infrastructure and the economy.3 Climate change is thus a threat multiplier across the North. The Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF) observes that “the qualities that make the Canadian Arctic and North such a special place, its size, climate, and small but vibrant and resilient populations, also pose unique security challenges, making it difficult to maintain situational awareness and respond to emergencies or military threats when and where they occur.” Climate change compounds these challenges, reshaping the regional environment and, in some contexts and seasons, facilitating greater access to an increasingly “broad range of actors and interests” (both Canadian and international) in the region. “The effects of climate change are perhaps most pronounced in the Arctic,” the Canadian Army’s modernizations strategy notes. "Rising activity levels in Canada's Arctic by state and commercial actors raise the potential for safety and security-related challenges," including "search and rescue operations, response to natural or man-made disasters, and response to actions by states with interests in the Arctic." The military is cast in a supporting role to other Canadian partners in a comprehensive Whole of Government approach, wherein the CAF assists other government departments and agencies in fulfilling their mandates within the safety and security domains.4
While most strategic analyses of the Arctic stress the role that climate and environmental change will play in “opening” the region to the broader world, this must be counterbalanced by considerations of the heightened constraints that changing and increasingly unpredictable environmental conditions will have on operations in the Canadian Arctic. “Geography and seasonal changes in climate will affect the degree of risk to the integrity of sparse Northern infrastructure such as roads, airfields, port facilities, communications networks, or power plants,” the 2013 Canadian Joint Operations Command Plan for the North noted. “The impacts of climate change are not only being observed from an economic vantage point, but the environmental impacts will put enormous strains on how the CAF conducts operations in the north and will require a change in how operations are planned and conducted.”5 For example, permafrost degradation not only inhibits mobility but also affects physical infrastructure, thus exacerbating sustainment problems (with a recent report predicting annual costs of permafrost damage to Yukon paved and gravel roads at between $73-85 million per year with adaptation measures).6 The North's road networks will continue to be affected by unusual and unpredictable seasonal temperatures and precipitation, resulting in shortened seasons or road closures.7 The increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather will affect operational activities, while changing sea ice conditions, ocean currents, and temperature complicate acoustic modelling and other operational and strategic planning factors.8 Consequently, the regional impacts of climate change over the short- to medium-term horizons are likely to exacerbate rather than alleviate operational challenges by increasing the level of uncertainty in the Canadian North.9
Provincial and territorial authorities are the first to respond when a major natural disaster occurs in Canada. If they become overwhelmed, they can ask the federal government for assistance. If the CAF is selected as the federal instrument to help, the response and ensuing efforts to stabilize a disaster situation falls within Operation LENTUS. There is an established plan of action to support communities in crisis that can be adapted to multiple situations, including forest fires, floods, ice storms, or hurricanes. The size of the CAF elements deployed is based on the scale of the disaster and the nature of the request for assistance from the territory, which the CAF uses to determine how many people and what kinds of assets to send.10
The high proportion of Indigenous people in the territories, coupled with Ottawa’s political focus on improving Indigenous-Crown relations and promoting reconciliation, lead most federal politicians to link Arctic security to Indigenous Peoples’ security. Studies and reports highlight longstanding inequalities in transportation, energy, communications, employment, community infrastructure, health services, and education that continue to disadvantage Northern Indigenous Peoples compared to other Canadians. Furthermore, poor socio-economic and health indicators affirm significant gaps between Northern Canadian jurisdictions and their southern counterparts, elucidating higher rates of human insecurity in the Canadian Arctic. While many of these issue areas fall outside of core national defence and national security mandates, they should be considered in light of broader nation-to-nation relationships and reconciliation agendas.
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Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He was Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories from 2014-2020 and was reappointed to this position from 2022-2025. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Brian Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University and the Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience, School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Indigenous-state relations. Whitney has (co-) written or (co-) edited more than sixty books and more than one hundred academic articles and chapters
1 - NWT, Yukon, and Nunavut, Pan-Northern Territorial Leaders’ Statement on Climate Change (May 2022), https://yukon.ca/sites/yukon.ca/files/eco/eco-pan-northern-leaders-statement-climate-change-2022_0.pdf.
2 - See, for example, Peter Kikkert, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and Angulalik Pedersen, Kitikmeot Roundtable on Search and Rescue – Mass Rescue Table Top Exercise Report (2020), https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Kitikmeot-Roundtable-on-SAR-MRO-Tabletop-Exercise-Report-Feb-2020.pdf; Public Safety Canada, Canada’s National Adaptation Strategy: Building Resilient Communities and a Strong Economy (2023), https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2023/eccc/en4/En4-544-2023-eng.pdf; GNWT, Executive and Indigenous Affairs, “Pan-Northern Leaders’ Statement on Climate Change,” https://www.eia.gov.nt.ca/en/priorities/relations-federal-provincial-territorial-and-international-governments/pan-northern.
3 - YG, Science and Natural Resources, “Climate Change in the Yukon,” https://yukon.ca/en/climate-change-yukon.
4 - Canadian Army, Advancing with Purpose: The Canadian Army Modernization Strategy, 4th ed. (Ottawa: Canadian Army HQ, 2020), 7.
5 - Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) Plan for North, January 2014, file 3350-1 (J5), 11.
6 - Canadian Climate Institute (CCI), Due North: Facing the Costs of Climate Change for Northern Infrastructure (June 2022), 38, https://climateinstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Due-North.pdf.
7 - K. Pendakur, “Northern Territories,” in Climate Risks and Adaptation Practices for the Canadian Transportation Sector 2016, eds. K. Palko and D.S. Lemmen (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2017), 27-64.
8 - US Navy Chief of Naval Operations, The United States Navy Strategic Outlook for the Arctic (January 2019), 9.
9 - See, for example, Adam Lajeunesse and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, eds., Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Operations, 1945-2015: Historical and Contemporary Lessons Learned (Fredericton: Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society,2017); and P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, “An Important International Crossroads”: Implementing Canada’s Arctic Priorities in Strong, Secure, Engaged (Toronto: Centre for National Security Studies, Canadian Forces College, 2018), https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/CNSS/arctic-eng.pdf?cfc.
10 - DND, “Operation LENTUS,” https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-lentus.html.