Research

In 1936 in front of the House of Commons, Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King famously said that “if some countries have too much history, we have too much geography.” Almost 90 years later and this statement is still relevant, especially when considering Canada’s North and Arctic. Holding approximately 40% of Canada’s landmass and less than 1% of the national population, the geography of Canada’s North and Arctic is not only unique, but it presents challenges in the context of national security and defence.  

Combined with the increasing strategic and economic significance of the Arctic and the increasing number of threats facing the region, there is a need to analyze and evaluate the roles and capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in the North and Arctic. Recognizing the vastness of the region, there is a specific need to examine whether the geographical locations of military infrastructure offer the strategic and operational value needed for the CAF to engage in operations effectively throughout Canada’s North and Arctic.

To that end, this report seeks to answer the following research question:

- To what extent do existing, proposed, and hypothetical locations of Canadian Armed Forces infrastructure in the North and Arctic provide the strategic and operational value needed to meet Canada’s Arctic security objectives?

To answer this question, this report begins by providing a preliminary analysis of the threats facing Canada’s North and Arctic and the ensuing objectives of the CAF in response to these threats. After determining the threats facing Canada’s North and Arctic and the CAF’s ensuing objectives in the region, this report will directly answer the research question by engaging in various quantitative analyses and models to determine whether existing, proposed, and hypothetical locations of military infrastructure in the region grant the strategic and operational value needed for the CAF to meet its objectives. This report then offers several recommendations to the federal government, the CAF, and territorial governments based on the report’s findings.

The topic of Arctic security is clearly top of mind for many policymakers in Canada. With Canada’s defence policy update explicitly describing the Arctic as a “key trend” defining national security and Canada’s recent NATO commitment of spending 5% of GDP on defence by 2035, the contents of this report can help ensure that defence and security policy in the North and Arctic is deliberate, sustainable, and effective. Furthermore, this report responds directly to one of the recommendations in the 2023 “Arctic Security Under Threat” Senate report, one of the most comprehensive reports on the state of Arctic security in Canada. Specifically, Recommendation 12 suggests that the “Government of Canada evaluate whether changes to the size, locations [emphasis added]or nature of the Canadian Armed Forces’ presence in the Canadian Arctic are required.”

In this context, the report contributes to an urgent national discussion by offering a structured, evidence-based, and quantitative assessment of the CAF’s Arctic footprint. By examining whether existing, proposed, and hypothetical military infrastructure locations align with Canada’s evolving defence objectives, this report aims to inform strategic policymaking and ensure that Canada’s Northern and Arctic defence posture is not only reactive, but proactive and fit for purpose.

This report was commissioned by the Canadian Institute for Arctic Security, based in the Yukon, to examine the unique vulnerabilities of Arctic electoral systems and outline strategies to safeguard democracy in the North. It addresses three central research questions:

- What vulnerabilities most threaten electoral integrity in the Canadian Arctic?

- Why might foreign actors seek to manipulate northern elections, and through what methods?

- And how can federal safeguards be adapted to strengthen electoral systems in Northern and Indigenous contexts?

The work reflects the Institute’s commitment to strengthening Canada’s democratic resilience in the face of foreign interference and disinformation.

This report examines the vulnerabilities of Arctic electoral systems and identifies strategies to safeguard democracy in the North. It highlights three interconnected domains of resilience:

- Institutional Strengthening: Enhancing intelligence coordination, expanding the SITE Task Force to territorial elections, and directing federal resources toward Arctic election security.

- Disinformation and Media Literacy: Drawing lessons from Finland’s whole-society model, while adapting Canadian initiatives such as the Digital Citizen Initiative, the Digital Citizen Contribution Program, MediaSmarts, and CIVIX to northern and Indigenous contexts.

- Community-Led Approaches: Supporting Indigenous governments, local media, and community organizations to lead resilience efforts, ensuring safeguards reflect Arctic political realities and cultural diversity.

The analysis underscores that resilience cannot be achieved by replicating southern Canadian safeguards wholesale. Instead, it requires tailored approaches that integrate cybersecurity, transparency, disinformation countermeasures, and Indigenous leadership. Federal and territorial collaboration, combined with civil society engagement, offers the most promising path to strengthening democratic integrity in the North.

Safeguarding democracy in the Yukon and across Canada’s Arctic is not only a regional priority but a national imperative, requiring coordinated action now to ensure electoral integrity in the decades ahead.